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1. Introduction  
Randomised social experiments are generally hailed as the gold standard in program evaluation.  
They are in fact the most reliable partial-equilibrium method for evaluating whether a program 
works, on average, for its participants – provided certain conditions are met.
1
 An overarching label 
for such identifying conditions is the “no randomisation bias” assumption (first identified by 
Heckman, 1992; see also Heckman et al., 1999), which rules out that random assignment per se has 
affected potential outcomes
2
, as well as the program participation process. One of the most power-
ful critiques of the use of randomised experiments in the social sciences is thus the possibility that 
individuals might react to the randomisation itself, thereby making it impossible to infer the behav-
iour in real life from that observed in the experimental conditions. To our knowledge there is how-
ever no empirical evidence on the existence and scope of randomization bias, and no approach has 
been put forward for dealing with it.  
This paper is the very first to tackle the issue of randomization bias with real experimental data. 
Specifically, we are in the unusual position to empirically test the extent to which random assign-
ment has affected the process of participation in the experiment. We further propose a non-
experimental way of assessing the extent to which the treatment effects stemming from the experi-
mental sample are representative of the impacts that would have been experienced by the population 
who would have been exposed to the program in routine mode.  
We offer a theoretical framework for the systematic consideration of randomisation bias, and 
then develop an analysis framework based on the conditional independence assumption (CIA). We 
consider both the case of administrative outcome measures available for the entire relevant sample 
and of survey-based outcome measures. With administrative outcomes we highlight how the ran-
domisation itself can actually offer ways to support non-experimental methods in addressing the 
shortcoming it gave rise to. Specifically, we show that the standard CIA required to identify the av-
erage treatment effect of interest is made up of two parts. One part remains testable under the ex-
periment and offers a way to correct non-experimental estimates that fail to pass the test. The other 
part rests on what we argue is a very weak assumption, at least in our application. For the case of 
survey outcomes we extend our estimators to also account for selective non-response based on ob-
served characteristics. Both for the case of administrative and survey data we further extend our 
proposed estimators to deal with the non-linear case of binary outcomes. 
The issue which motivated the paper arose in the recent Employment Retention and Advance-
ment (ERA) demonstration, which ran in six districts across the UK between 2003 and 2007. With 
                                                 
 
1
 For a discussion and appraisal of randomised experiments, see e.g. Burtless (1995) and Heckman and Smith (1995). 
2
 As such it also rules out control group contamination, whereby control group members engage in a different type or 
intensity of alternative programs from what they would have done in the absence of the experiment. 
 3
over 16,000 individuals being randomly assigned, the ERA study represented the largest random-
ised trial of a social program in the UK. The trial was set up to test the effectiveness of offering 
time-limited support once in work, in the form of advisory services and a new set of financial incen-
tives rewarding sustained full-time work and the completion of training whilst employed. Eligible 
for this initiative were long-term unemployed over the age of 25 mandated to enter the New Deal 25 
Plus (ND25+) program, and lone parents who volunteered for the New Deal for Lone Parents 
(NDLP) program.
3
 In the first follow-up year, the employment chances of both groups remained 
largely unaffected, while a sizeable experimental impact was found in terms of earnings, especially 
for the NDLP group (see Hendra et al., 2011 for the final appraisal of ERA). 
Since ERA offered a package of support once in work, all individuals flowing into ND25+ and 
NDLP in the six evaluation districts during the one-year intake window should automatically have 
become eligible to be offered ERA. It has however emerged that only parts of the target population 
have entered the evaluation sample: some eligibles actively refused to be randomly assigned (the 
“formal refusers”), while some were somehow not even offered the possibility to participate in ran-
dom assignment and hence in ERA (the “diverted customers”). A sizeable fraction of the eligibles – 
23% of ND25+ and 30% of NDLP – were thus not represented in the experiment. 
While the policymaker would be interested in the average impact of offering ERA services and 
incentives for all those who would have been eligible to receive such an offer in the absence of ran-
domisation, the experimental evaluation can provide unbiased impact estimates only for the ex-
perimental sample – those who reached the randomisation stage and agreed to be randomly as-
signed. The concern is that the ERA study participants may be a selective group, potentially render-
ing the corresponding experimental impacts irrelevant for policy purposes. Note that it was the ex-
perimental set-up per se which gave rise to diverted customers and formal refusers, as these eligible 
individuals were denied or ‘refused’ participation in something which in normal circumstances one 
could not be denied or one could not ‘refuse’: becoming eligible for financial incentives and per-
sonal advice. Randomisation can thus be viewed as having affected the process of participation in 
ERA, resulting in an adviser-selected and self-selected subgroup which is potentially different from 
the sample of New Deal entrants who would have been exposed to the offer of ERA had it not been 
evaluated via random assignment. Randomisation bias would then be present if the average effect 
for the experimental group is different from the average effect which would have arisen had the 
program been run in routine mode. Non-participation in the ERA study can thus be seen as poten-
                                                 
 
3
 These two groups represent 83% of all ERA study participants. We do not consider the third target group due to its 
conceptually different set-up coupled with lack of data. 
 4
tially introducing randomisation bias in the experimental estimate for the impact of offering ERA 
eligibility on the eligible population.
4
  
Note that non-participation in the ERA study, which takes place before random assignment, is a 
distinct problem from non- or partial compliance (no-shows, drop-outs, non-take up), which takes 
place after treatments have been assigned.
5
 This type of non-participation is also separate from en-
try effects
6
; the extrapolation to other populations beyond the pilot areas (see e.g. Hotz et al., 2005, 
for the extrapolation of experimental results to other sites); and attrition (loss of experimental sam-
ple in the collection of outcome information). 
The beauty of the ERA study is that it offers the rare chance to empirically measure the extent 
to which randomisation has affected the participation process. This is because (1) the treatment is 
the bestowing of an eligibility (to advisory services and financial incentives); (2) the parameter of 
interest is the average impact of offering this eligibility (the intention to treat effect); and (3) in rou-
tine mode the offer of this eligibility would have covered a well-defined and observed population: 
all ND25+ and NDLP entrants in the six districts over the intake window. 
The key objective of the paper is to recover the causal effect of making the ERA package avail-
able for the full eligible population, i.e. for all those who would have been exposed to the ERA of-
fer in the absence of randomisation. We thus use non-experimental methods to quantify the impact 
that the full eligible population would have been likely to experience in the first follow-up year, and 
subsequently test for the presence of randomisation bias by assessing whether this impact for the 
eligible group differs from the experimental impact estimated on the subgroup of ERA study par-
ticipants. Given that the first-year experimental impacts are at times substantial, it is important to 
assess whether such estimates suffer from randomisation bias.  
With “experimentation on a context-specific subpopulation”, Manski (1996) advocates bound-
ing the treatment effect of substantive interest (done for ERA in Sianesi, 2010), as in general very 
strong assumptions on entry into the study are needed for point identification. Our analyses of ad-
ministrative outcomes focus on matching and reweighting techniques under the CIA assumption 
that we observe all the ERA outcome-relevant characteristics that drive selection into the ERA 
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 An alternative but, as we discuss in Section 3.2, possibly less pertinent way to consider this issue is as a threat to the 
external validity of the experimental estimates. 
5
 The set-up and aims of Dubin and Rivers (1993) are opposite to the ones in the current paper. In their set-up, refusal to 
participate in the wage subsidy experiment happened after random assignment (to the program group). While their ex-
periment thus directly recovers the intention to treat (it also includes non-take up of the subsidy by participants them-
selves), the authors aim to tease out the impact on the participants. Their formal refusers could be viewed as the pro-
gram group “no-shows” considered by Bloom (1984), and indeed the approach followed by Dubin and Rivers builds 
upon the Bloom estimator. Note also that the non-participants in the ERA experiment were not exposed to ERA, and 
thus no link can be made to the literature on “dropouts” (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2000). 
6
 The new ERA incentives and entitlement rules could affect individual behaviour so as to gain eligibility (see Moffitt, 
1992). Some long-term unemployed could e.g. be induced to delay exit from unemployment in order to reach the start 
of ND25+-with-ERA, or more lone parents could be induced to volunteer for NDLP-with-ERA. The composition of 




 While our data include demographics, information on the current unemployment spell, ex-
tremely detailed labour market histories over the previous three years and local factors, the CIA 
needed to identify the average treatment effect on the non-treated (the non-participants in our case) 
is admittedly strong. We show however that this CIA has two parts. One part is testable under the 
experiment.
8
 The other part is the requirement that individuals were not diverted or did not formally 
refuse based on residual unobserved idiosyncratic ERA impacts conditional on arbitrarily heteroge-
neous impacts according to our rich set of observed characteristics – a highly plausible assumption 
as we argue in Section 5.4. Under this weak condition we can thus formally test the validity of the 
standard CIA assumption and, should it be rejected, correct the non-experimental estimates from 
selection bias. Of course, the corrected estimates are equivalent to those derived directly under our 
identifying assumption of no selection into the ERA study based on unobserved impacts. 
An interesting by-product of testing the standard CIA assumption is that we can assess the va-
lidity in our application of the claim often made in the literature that knowledge of long and detailed 
labour market histories can control for most selection bias in the evaluation of labour market inter-
ventions (see e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, Heckman and Smith, 1999, Heckman et al., 1998 and 
1999, and Frölich, 2004; to some extent Hotz et al., 2005; and for a caveat, Dolton and Smith, 2011, 
Lechner and Wunsch, 2011, and Biewen et al., forthcoming). We found that the claim that histories 
variables can capture labour-market relevant unobservables was not borne out in our data. Addi-
tionally, in contrast to Dolton and Smith (2011), the way of summarising labour market histories 
did not make the slightest difference in reducing selection bias in terms of no-treatment outcomes. 
Our main findings highlight the power of our suggested strategy for the case of ERA, where the 
additional information from the experimental set-up consistently altered the conclusions arising 
from standard non-experimental methods in terms of employment outcomes. Specifically, non-
experimental methods relying on the standard CIA based on the available data appeared to suggest 
that the experimental estimates underestimate the average impact that the full ND25+ eligible popu-
lation would have experienced absent randomisation, while being representative of the effect for all 
NDLP eligibles. For both intake groups, however, once the non-experimental estimates were cor-
rected to reflect failure of the test, the experimental estimates were shown to have a tendency to ac-
tually overestimate the average effect that all eligibles would have experienced. This overturning of 
the conclusion could only be reached by a judicious combination of both non-experimental methods 
and the experimental set-up.  
The experimental results in terms of survey earnings were by contrast found to be unbiased es-
timates of the impact on all eligibles, even after addressing survey and item non-response: the at 
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 The only other paper we are aware of which considers this kind of non-participation in an experiment, Kamionka and 
Lacroix (2008), relies on a duration model under different distributional assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity. 
8
 This test exploits the controls in a way akin to the third test in Heckman and Hotz (1989). 
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times sizeable gain for responding participants was found to be a reliable representations of what 
the impacts would have been for the full group of eligibles in the absence of randomisation. 
In conclusion, we found evidence that the 26.6% non-participation rate in the ERA experiment 
has introduced some randomisation bias in the experimental estimates in terms of employment out-
comes, but has not affected the experimental estimates in terms of survey earnings.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the ERA study, outlines 
how non-participation in the study has come about and summarises the available qualitative evi-
dence. Section 3 sets out a theoretical framework for randomisation bias, first in general terms and 
then showing how it simplifies in the ERA set-up. Section 4 describes the sample definitions and 
data content and provides some basic descriptives. Our methodological approaches are outlined in 
Section 5. After setting out the analysis framework in Section 5.1, we discuss how to assess and 
deal with randomisation bias when administrative outcomes are observed for the entire relevant 
sample (Section 5.2) and when only survey outcomes are available (Section 5.3), in both situations 
considering the case of continuous as well as binary outcomes. Section 5.4 provides an in-depth 
discussion of the plausibility of our identifying assumption. The results of all the empirical analyses 
are presented in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The ERA intervention and non-participation in the ERA study 
2.1 The Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) study   
ERA was conceived as an ambitious ‘next step’ in UK welfare-to-work policy. The existing New 
Deal programs were uniquely focused on helping non-working people on benefits find jobs, with no 
guidance offered to them once they entered work. By contrast, ERA’s remit was to help break the 
‘low-pay-no-pay cycle’ so common among low-wage workers by concentrating on in-work support 
to help stabilise (“Retention”) and improve (“Advancement”) their work situations. While still un-
employed, ERA offered job placement assistance as done by the regular New Deal programs. How-
ever once in work (and for up to two years), ERA offered a combination of financial incentives and 
access to employment counselling services.
9
  
The ERA study was set-up to test the effectiveness of offering this package of post-placement 
support in helping individuals retain and progress in work. It is important to stress that ERA was the 
offer of a package of in-work support, and that the ERA experiment was a randomisation of eligibil-
ity design, in which eligible individuals (New Deal entrants) were randomly selected to be offered 
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 Specifically ERA offered (a) access to employment-related assistance by an adviser; (b) eligibility to a retention bonus 
of £400 three times a year for staying in full-time work 75% of the time, and to training tuition assistance (up to £1,000) 
and a training bonus (also up to £1,000) for completing training whilst at least part-time employed, and (c) access to 
emergency payments from a Discretionary Fund to overcome short-term barriers to remain in work. 
 7
the new treatment. Specifically, the program group was offered (or became eligible to) the new 
ERA services and incentives, while the control group continued to receive their usual New Deal 
services. For the two New Deal groups, the ERA study thus aimed at assessing the average effect of 
offering eligibility to ERA services and incentives (against the benchmark treatment of the standard 
New Deal). This average treatment effect (ATE) for the eligibles of making such a package avail-
able is unconditional on the actual take-up of any element of this offer
10
 and should thus be inter-
preted as an intention-to-treat effect. For many purposes, this is the policy-relevant parameter, as it 
is informative on how the availability of ERA services and incentives affects individual outcomes. 
 
2.2 Non-participation in the ERA study  
As discussed above, the ERA treatment was the bestowing of an eligibility (to advisory services, 
financial incentives and a discretionary fund), which under normal conditions – that is in the ab-
sence of the randomised trial and/or if it were an official policy – would cover all New Deal en-
trants. Thus in an ideal scenario, the ERA study would have performed randomisation among all 
individuals starting the New Deal in the six evaluation districts over the intake window.
11
 Depar-
tures from this ideal situation have however arisen from two sources: 
1. intake process: not all eligible individuals have been offered the possibility to be randomly as-
signment and hence become eligible to ERA (the “diverted customers”); and 
2. individual consent: some individuals who were offered the chance to take part in the experimen-
tal evaluation actively refused to do so (the “formal refusers”). 
Diverted customers and formal refusers make up the group of the “ERA non-participants”, those 
who whilst eligible for ERA have not been included in the experimental sample. The “ERA study 
participants” are those who were eligible for ERA, were offered the chance to participate in the 
study and agreed to take part. These are those making up the evaluation sample, i.e. those who were 
subsequently randomly assigned either to the program group, who was offered ERA services and 
incentives, or to the control group, who only received the New Deal program whilst unemployed. 
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 It of course always remained up to individuals to decide whether and to what extent to avail themselves of the ERA 
elements. For instance, around 15% of the program group reported that they had had no contact at all with employment 
office staff during the year following their randomisation into the ERA group. Furthermore, some program group mem-
bers may simply not (or no longer) be aware of some of the ERA features, as testified by the 1-year follow-up survey 
according to which around one quarter of the program group who had not heard of the retention bonus and as many as 
half or more (49% for NDLP and 57% for ND25+) who were not aware of the training bonus. 
11
 It may help to think of how ERA would have been evaluated in the absence of random assignment. The standard way 
to evaluate programs in the UK is the pilot vs. comparison area-based scheme. ERA would have been introduced in the 
six ‘pilot’ districts, the New Deal inflow in those areas would have been viewed as the treated group, for whom the 
evaluator would have chosen a (possibly matched) comparison group from the New Deal inflow in other (possibly 
matched) comparable districts (see e.g. the evaluation of the Educational Maintenance Allowance by Dearden et al., 
2009). In the standard design there would have been no self-selection issues, since the entire eligible population in the 
pilot areas would be covered by the ERA offer. For the two New Deal groups, random assignment was thus implicitly 
deployed to control for area effects, that is for systematic differences in the eligible population between areas, as well as 
for area-specific macroeconomic effects or trends. 
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Qualitative work conducted as part of the ERA evaluation has shed interesting light on the ori-
gins of non-participation by looking closely at the assignment and participation process in ERA at 
selected sites (Hall et al., 2005, and Walker et al., 2006). Based on detailed observations and inter-
views with staff and individuals, the authors conjecture that it is quite unlikely for ERA non-
participants to be a random subgroup of the two eligible New Deal groups. The discussion of what 
is known about non-participation from this qualitative work is organized in two parts.  
1. Ensuring that staff randomly assigned all eligible individuals   
The six districts could exercise considerable discretion in how they organised the ERA intake and 
random assignment processes.
12
 Although the expectation was that the intake staff, be it an ERA or 
a New Deal Adviser, would encourage all eligible individuals – and encourage all of them equally 
hard – to consent to be randomly assigned and have a chance to become eligible to ERA, staff could 
use discretion on two fronts: what individuals to tell about ERA, directly determining the extent of 
diverted customers, and in what terms to present and market ERA to individuals, thus affecting their 
likelihood to become formal refusers. As to the latter, the abstract notion that staff would use the 
same level of information and enthusiasm in recruiting all eligible individuals was particularly hard 
to implement in practice. Discretion in their choice of marketing strategy could take various forms: 
how ‘hard’ to sell ERA; what features of the program to mention – in particular whether and in 
what terms to mention the retention bonus, or whether to selectively emphasise features (e.g. the 
training bonus) to make ERA more appealing to the particular situation of a given individual; and 
how far to exploit the misunderstanding that participation in the study be mandatory.
13
 
But why and under what circumstances would caseworkers want to apply such discretion? Ad-
visers were given individual-level targets for how many people they moved into work and were ac-
cordingly rewarded for job entries. This incentive structure seems to have led advisers conducting 
the intake process to use their own discretion in deciding what individuals to sell random assign-
ment or how hard to sell it in order to ‘hang onto’ those whom they perceived as likely to move into 
work quickly. According to the ERA implementation study (Walker et al., 2006, p.26-17), “this in-
centive structure was real and widely recognised”, so that “when New Deal Advisers undertook the 
interviewing, they had reason to encourage people with poor job prospects to join ERA (because in 
many cases they would move on to ERA advisers and off their caseloads) and those with good 
prospects to refuse (because they would keep them on their caseloads and get credit for a place-
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 In some districts, it was the New Deal advisers who conducted the intake and randomisation, with the ERA advisers 
being responsible for working with the ERA program group only after random assignment had taken place. In other 
districts, both types of advisers were responsible for conducting intake interviews and randomisation. These models did 
not necessarily apply at the district level, since within a particular district, different offices and staff members some-
times used somewhat different procedures. The intake and randomisation procedures further varied over time, in the 
light of experience and depending on the situation and needs of the district or even single office. 
13
 It additionally became apparent that probably owing to their greater knowledge of and enthusiasm for ERA, ERA 
advisers tended to give clearer explanations of ERA than New Deal advisers (Walker et al., 2006, Appendix F). 
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ment). When ERA advisers were involved in conducting intake interviews, they could have bene-
fited from encouraging customers with poor employment prospects to refuse ERA and people with 
good prospects to join.” Job entry targets had thus an asymmetric influence on the incentives of 
New Deal and of ERA advisers: where the intake was conducted by New Deal advisers, job-ready 
individuals would be more likely to be diverted from ERA; where ERA advisers were doing the in-
take, they would be less likely to be diverted. It thus appears quite unlikely that non-participants, 
and especially diverted customers, be random subgroups of the eligible population; rather, these 
were people whom advisers had a vested interest in not subjecting to ERA. 
2. How willing were individuals to be randomly assigned?   
Individuals who were given the option to participate in random assignment could formally refuse
14
 
and thus be excluded from the experimental sample. It is not fully clear how much individuals actu-
ally knew about what they were refusing – according to observations at intake and interviews with 
the unemployed themselves after those sessions, not much.
15
  
The qualitative work highlighted how recruitment to ERA greatly differed between the two 
New Deal groups. While lone parents on NDLP were all volunteers to that program and thus mostly 
responded favourably to ERA too, ND25+ participants were more difficult to recruit. The reasons 
for formal refusal that were identified included being puzzled by how the additional offer of ERA 
fitted in the mandatory participation in ND25+, having been unemployed for long periods of time 
and thus finding it difficult to envisage what might happen after they obtained a job, an outcome 
that they and their advisers thought rather unlikely anyway, and feeling close to getting a job in the 
near future and not wanting to stay in touch with the office. It thus appears that the group of formal 
refusers, and in particular those amongst the more problematic ND25+ group, might be far from 
random, and instead selected on (predicted) non-ERA outcomes. Some staff further identified spe-
cific attitudes and traits as good predictors that individuals, particularly among those mandated to 
start ND25+, would decline participation: a strong antipathy to government, feeling alienated from 
systems of support and governance, being resistant to change or taking risks, ‘preferring to stick 
with what they know’, reacting against the labour market, and enjoying being able to refuse to do 
something in the context of a mandatory program. A further possible reason for refusal was being 
engaged in benefit fraud. Overall, the qualitative evidence suggests that those who declined to join 
may, in fact, differ in important respects from those who agreed to participate. Formal refusers, es-
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 Signing: “I do not consent to taking part in this research scheme or to being randomly assigned.” 
15
 Walker et al. (2006) conclude that “very few customers could be described as understanding ERA, and all of them 
had already been assigned to the program group and therefore had been given further details about the services avail-
able” and “there was a consensus among the Technical Advisers who conducted both the observations and the inter-
views with customers […] that most customers truly did not have a good appreciation of ERA.” (p.43). 
 10
pecially those amongst the more problematic ND25+ group, appeared to have weaker job prospects 
and poorer attitudes than the average New Deal entrant. 
As mentioned, caseworkers could decide how to sell ERA in order to steer individuals’ refusal 
decisions. When New Deal advisers undertook the intake interviews, they could benefit if job-ready 
individuals refused to participate in the ERA study and those with bad prospects consented. Con-
versely, when ERA advisers were leading the intake process, they could benefit if individuals with 
bad job prospects formally refused, while those with good prospects agreed. 
While the insights provided by these in-depth case studies were based on only very few obser-
vations and thus could not be safely generalised, Goodman and Sianesi (2007) thoroughly explored 
both how large and how selective the non-participating groups were. Results are summarised in 
Section 4.4, highlighting how the non-participation problem is a relevant one, both in terms of its 
incidence (26.6% of all eligibles) and of the diversity of the excluded groups.  
 
3. Randomisation bias: A theoretical framework 
3.1 A general framework
16
 
Consider the general set-up of a program, which can either run in routine mode (RCT=0) or is im-
plemented along with a randomised trial (RTC=1). Interest is in evaluating the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT). Randomisation bias can naturally be defined as a situation where the 
fact that a program is being implemented alongside a randomised trial gives rise to an average 
treatment effect on the treated, ATT(1), which is different from the average effect on the treated 
which would have arisen had the program been run in routine mode, ATT(0). 
For now, imagine that eligible individuals can decide whether to participate or not in the pro-
gram, with D(RCT) being a binary indicator denoting participation. The notation highlights how 
individual participation decisions can potentially depend on whether the program is being evaluated 
by random assignment or is run in routine mode. A first channel for randomization bias to operate is 
thus that the proportion of participants differs under randomization and in routine mode, i.e. 
P(Di(1)=1) ≠ P(Di(0)=1), and that such differences between the populations participating under the 
two scenarios also translate into a difference in the corresponding ATT’s. 
The second channel of randomisation bias is one whereby randomisation per se may affect pro-
gram impacts. To formalise it, potential outcomes
17
 are allowed to depend on RCT: Y1i(1) denotes 
the outcome of individual i if i were to participate in the program implemented along a randomised 
trial and Y1i(0) is the outcome of individual i if i were to participate in the program implemented in 
routine mode, and Y0i(RCT) denote the corresponding no-treatment outcomes, similarly allowed to 
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 I am indebted to a referee for suggestions on how to set up a theoretical framework to think about randomisation bias. 
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 For the potential outcome framework see Rubin (1974).  
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differ according to whether the program is under randomisation or not. For example, Y1(RCT) will 
depend on RCT if the presence of random assignment disrupts the normal operation of the program, 
or if knowing that it is an experiment changes the behaviour of the program group; while Y0(RCT) 
will depend on RCT in the presence of control group substitution (a situation in which control group 
members engage in a different type or intensity of alternative programs from what they would have 
done in the absence of the experiment), or if control group members are disappointed from being 
randomised out in a way that affects their no-treatment outcomes. 
The full definition of randomisation bias (Heckman, 1992; Heckman et al., 1999) is thus:  
ATT(1) ≡ E(Y1i(1) – Y0i(1) | Di(1)=1) ≠ E(Y1i(0) – Y0i(0) | Di(0)=1) ≡ ATT(0)  
In the following, we ignore the possibility that random assignment per se has affected impacts, 
in other words we assume Yki(1) = Yki(0) = Yki for k=0,1 and for all i. This seems a very reasonable 
assumption in the case of ERA, as it is not easy to envisage how the initial randomisation process 
could have disrupted the treatment, which is eligibility to financial incentives and advisory ser-
vices.
18
 As to no-treatment outcomes, control group substitution can safely be ruled out as the con-
trol group was simply not eligible to ERA-style in-work incentives and support elsewhere. Discour-
agement effects were similarly highly unlikely as the control group didn’t effectively know what 
ERA was about (see Section 2.2). In any case any initial disappointment that might have arisen 
from being randomised out of a mystery treatment would have long faded by the time we look at 
labour market outcomes one year later. 
Our definition of randomization bias thus simplifies to:  
ATT(1) ≡ E(Y1i – Y0i | Di(1)=1) ≠ E(Y1i – Y0i | Di(0)=1) ≡ ATT(0)                (1) 
Let us now look in more detail at participation decisions. According to the potential participa-
tion behaviour, the population of all eligibles can be partitioned into four groups (similarly to the 
LATE framework of Imbens and Angrist, 1994): 
• The compliers are those who decide not to participate because of randomisation: for them, 
Di(1) < Di(0). Compliers arise e.g. if some eligibles withhold consent to be randomly assigned 
or, in case participation in the program entails some cost (e.g. in the form of preparatory ac-
tivities), if some decide not to participate because they do not value the probability of obtain-
ing the treatment as much as the certainty of obtaining it (threat of service denial). 
• The defiers are those who are induced to participate by randomization: for them, Di(1) > 
Di(0). Defiers could e.g. arise if intake criteria need to be changed in order to accommodate 
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 The ERA intervention was indeed completely new for advisers, who after some initial struggles became more and 
more proficient in delivering it as time went by. But these are to be regarded as standard teething problems in imple-
menting a radically novel type of treatment (helping customers once in work), problems which are quite distinct from 
the initial randomisation process and which would equally have arisen had ERA been introduced without randomisa-
tion.  
 12
random assignment. Specifically, if it is required to maintain the program group at routine 
levels, the need to create a control group would entail the need to expand the pool of accepted 
participants. The additional recruits compared to normal operation (RCT=0) would be defiers. 
• The always-takers would participate in any case: Di(1) = Di(0) = 1.  
• The never-takers would not participate under either scenario: Di(1) = Di(0) = 0. 
Two problems need to be overcome in order to assess the presence of randomisation bias in (1):  
1. While we observe the participants under randomisation (the D(1)=1 group made up of the al-
ways-takers and the defiers), we do not in general observe those who would have participated 
under normal operation (the D(0)=1 group, encompassing the always-takers and the compliers). 
2. Even if we could identify the individuals in the D(0)=1 group, the experiment would not allow 
for the identification of the average effect that the program would have had for them.  
In short, when all that is available is a randomised trial, both the group of treated under normal op-
eration (D(0)=1) and the treatment effect for this group (ATT(0)) are in general unobserved as they 
entail some counterfactual components. However since both P(D(0)=1) and ATT(0) are the relevant 
parameters to make a decision about whether or not to implement the program in routine mode 
(Heckman and Smith, 1998), obtaining biased estimates from the randomised trial is a real issue.  
 
3.2 Randomisation bias in the ERA study  
In the ERA set-up, however, the first problem – i.e. the identification of the D(0)=1 group – greatly 
simplifies. This is because, as discussed in Section 2.1: 
(1) ERA was not a voluntary program where individuals needed to come forward to apply in order 
to receive the treatment
19
, but was the bestowing of an eligibility (eligibility to advisory ser-
vices, to financial incentives and to a discretionary fund);  
(2) the parameter of interest is the average impact of offering this eligibility; and  
(3) in routine mode the offer of this eligibility would have covered a well-defined (and indeed ob-
served) population: all New Deal entrants in the given districts over the given time window. The 
D(0)=1 group that would have been exposed to ERA under normal operation is thus observed.  
Note thus that by construction in the ERA set-up there were no never-takers, as under routine condi-
tions one cannot refuse to be eligible to something they are eligible to. There were also no defiers, 
i.e. there were no New Deal entrants who would be eligible to ERA only in the demonstration (as 
there was no possibility – nor indeed any need – to manipulate entry into the New Deal in order to 
create the pool to be randomly assigned). It follows that the observed group of ERA study partici-
                                                 
 
19
 New Deal entrants would never be required to apply in order to become eligible for ERA support; they would just be 
eligible for (or subject to) the ERA incentives and services by virtue of starting the New Deal (indeed the expectation 
was that even whilst unemployed in the New Deal individuals’ behaviour would be affected by ERA, e.g. waiting for a 
better match for improved retention and/or for a full-time job rather than taking the first low-pay low-stay job). 
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pants (the D(1)=1 group) is made up of the always-takers only, and that the compliers are identified 
as the complement to the full eligible population. That is, the compliers are those eligibles who 
were not included in the ERA study: the diverted customers and the formal refusers. The fact that 
ERA was a study and involved random assignment has thus created a pool of eligible individuals 
who were denied or artificially allowed to ‘refuse’
20
 participation in something which in routine cir-
cumstances one could not be denied or one could not ‘refuse’: becoming eligible for financial in-
centives and personal advice.
21
 Finally, the (observed) D(0)=1 group of New Deal entrants in the 
evaluation district and over the intake window is thus made up of the ERA study participants (the 
always-takers) and of the groups of formal refusers plus diverted customers (the compliers). 
In general, the causal effect of randomisation on program participation choices, P(D(1)=1) – 
P(D(0)=1), is unidentified, as one cannot observe individual participation decisions both in the 
presence and in absence of randomisation (an instance of Holland’s, 1986, “fundamental problem of 
causal inference”). However in the ERA case, as we have seen, an eligible individual’s participation 
status in the absence of randomisation is known, as they would all be eligible. P(D(0)=1) is thus 
equal to 1, and, due to the experiment, P(D(1)=1) is identified by the probability that an eligible is 
an ERA study participant. The causal impact of randomisation on participation patterns can thus be 
directly estimated by the observed share of non-participants. The incidence of non-participation by 
intake group and district is shown in Section 4.4. 
It is important to stress that even if one were to show that the ERA study participants are differ-
ent (in terms of observed and/or unobserved characteristics) from the full eligible population, this 
would not per se necessarily entail the presence of randomisation bias; as per condition (1), one 
would also need to show that the corresponding treatment effects differ as well. In other words, 
non-participation would have introduced randomisation bias in the experimental estimate for the 
impact of offering ERA eligibility on the eligible population if the average effect for the study par-
ticipants is different from the average effect that the full eligible population would have experi-
enced. Of course, even the ERA set-up faces the second problem of Section 3.1, as the experiment 
does not allow for the identification of the average effect that the program would have had on the 
full eligible population. We turn to these identification issues in Section 5. 
An alternative way to view non-participation is as a potential threat to the external validity of 
the experimental estimate (Cook and Campbell, 1979). In this case, the parameter of interest is not 
the impact of the ERA offer for all eligibles (in the six districts), but the impact of the ERA offer for 
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 As mentioned, individuals were not refusing ERA – of which they had no real knowledge – but to take part in the 
research or be randomly assigned. 
21
 This is of course not to say that randomisation necessarily entails changes in participation patterns, and in principle an 
experiment for ERA could have been devised in such as way as to avoid non-participation (e.g. not asking for consent, 
randomising offices rather than individuals, or even changing the incentive structure). Changes in participation patterns 
can however happen in a given experimental set-up – and have happened in the ERA set-up. 
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the sample of ERA study participants, and the issue is the extent to which such conclusions from 
the experiment would generalise to the whole eligible population (in the six evaluation districts).
22
  
Finally note that we are always only concerned with the current experimental evaluation, i.e. 
with the eligible group within the six ERA districts over the study intake window. There is the 
wider generalisability question that has a national rollout in mind and which relates to how the ex-




4. Data and sample  
4.1 Data  
A number of data files have been put together for the analysis. The administrative data held by the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) on ND25+ and NDLP entrants provided us with the 
sampling frame. We extracted files for all cases identified as having entered these New Deal pro-
grams in the six districts over the relevant random assignment period, as detailed below. We have 
further exploited the New Deal extract files for information about past program participation as well 
as a number of other relevant individual characteristics. 
We have then merged these files with the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS). 
This relatively recently released, spell-level dataset contains DWP information about time on bene-
fits and HMRC records about time in employment and, what became available only later in the 
evaluation, tax year earnings. These administrative records have been used to construct both de-
tailed labour market histories and outcome measures.  
We have further combined this data with information from the ERA evaluation dataset (specifi-
cally, the Basic Information Form, BIF) on the participation decision and the outcome of random 
assignment (program/control group) for those who agreed to be randomly assigned.  
Lastly, local-area level data (Census, travel-to-work and super-output area data) was merged in. 
In section 4.3 we summarise the extensive variables we have derived from all of these sources. 
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 This is how Kamionka and Lacroix (2008) cast the problem of non-participation in the Canadian Self-Sufficiency 
Entry Effects Demonstration, in which some eligibles could either not be contacted at baseline or refused to take part in 
the experiment. While the latter are the counterparts of the formal refusers in the ERA study and by construction arose 
because of randomisation, it does not in fact seem appropriate to argue that random assignment per se gave rise to the 
first type of non-participation in the Canadian experiment. 
23
 To assess the impact of offering ERA in routine mode to all eligibles in the UK, one would need to address complex 
issues such as (a) compositional differences in the population of eligibles (in terms of different New Deal inflows in the 
rest of the country compared to the ones in the six districts and/or different inflows at a time in the future under differ-
ent macro and local conditions; as well as arising from entry effects into the New Deal, e.g. more lone parents volun-
teering for NDLP in order to become eligible for ERA or some jobseekers over 25 not leaving unemployment in order 
to reach the start of ND25+ and hence ERA eligibility); (b) different ERA treatment (advisers would have become more 
adapt at delivering ERA and an increased knowledge and awareness of ERA among the eligibles would underlie the 
intention-to-treat effect); and (c) general equilibrium effects arising from the scaling up of a small pilot program.  
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4.2 Sample 
To define our sample of ERA eligibles, we need to define the criteria determining eligibility and 
identify the relevant individuals in the data.
24
 We consider as eligible for ERA: 
1. those who became mandatory for ND25+ during the period when the respective district was 
conducting random assignment and who subsequently also started the Gateway still within the 
relevant random assignment intake window; and 
2. those lone parents who were told about NDLP (had a work-focussed interview and/or expressed 
an interest in NDLP) during the period when the respective district was conducting random as-




The ERA study participants are directly identified by having signed their consent on the BIF; they 
make up the evaluation sample which was randomly assigned between a program group who was 
offered ERA services and incentives and a control group who was not. The formal refusers are also 
directly identified from the decision variable on the BIF. Diverted customers are those individuals 
who did start either the NDLP or ND25+ program during the intake period, but who for some rea-
son were not added to the BIF and thus to the ERA evaluation sample. In addition to caseworkers 
exercising discretion as to whom they told about ERA (see Section 2.2), there is also the (undocu-
mented) possibility that some individuals informally refused before having their BIF filled out. The 
diverted customers can only be identified residually, as those eligibles (as defined above) who did 
not appear on the BIF file. Formal refusers and diverted customers together form the group of non-
participants (in the ERA study). 
We also consider ERA impacts on earnings collected from the first ERA customer survey. This 
survey covers the experiences of a sample of ERA participants during the first 12 months following 
individuals’ dates of random assignment. When looking at survey outcomes, we consider the inter-
section of the random assignment and survey intake windows. There is in fact very good overlap, 
with only 5.6% of the full eligible sample being lost when imposing consistent intake criteria with 
those used to select the survey sample. 
Table 1 provides sample breakdowns by participation status and survey status. Non-
participation was substantially lower amongst the ND25+ group (23% of all eligibles) than the 
NDLP group (over 30%). We observe survey outcomes for around one third of study participants.  
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 See Goodman and Sianesi (2007) for a very detailed description. 
25
 The random assignment window was actually district- and intake group-specific, since one district started conducting 
random assignment later and some districts stopped earlier for some groups. Specifically, random assignment was con-
ducted between 1 Nov 2003 and 31 Oct 2004, with the exceptions of North West England (3 Jan 2004 to 31 Jan 2005) 
and the NDLP intake in Wales (1 Nov 2003 to 21 Aug 2004). 
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Table 1 Sample breakdown by target group  
 ND25 NDLP 
Eligibles 7,796 100.0%  7,261 100.0%  
– Study non-participants 1,790 23.0%  2,209 30.4%  
– Study participants 6,006 77.0% 100.0% 5,052 69.6% 100.0% 
    – with survey outcome 1,840  30.6% 1,745  34.5% 
    – without survey outcome 4,166  69.4% 3,307  65.5% 
 
 
4.3 Outcomes and observable characteristics  
We assess ERA impacts on employment and earnings during a 12-month follow-up period using 
both administrative and survey measures. 
Administrative data on employment is available from WPLS records for the full sample of ERA 
eligibles in the six districts, i.e. including the non-participants. We consider the probability of hav-
ing been employment after 12 months and the total number of days in employment, counting the 
12-month follow-up period from the moment individuals flowed in (i.e. from the moment ND25+ 
entrants started the Gateway, or lone parents volunteered for NDLP). 
Survey data on labour earnings in the 12-month follow-up period is available for a sample of 
participants. This measure offers a clean definition of employment (including all part-time work and 
self-employment; note it does not include the ERA bonuses) over a comparable horizon for each 
individual, i.e. over the year since their individual random assignment date. This was the only earn-
ings information originally available. Subsequently, administrative earnings information became 
available for all eligibles. However, these data do not include self-employment spells, nor do they 
systematically capture all part-time workers with low earnings. Furthermore, earnings are related to 
fiscal years, thus covering different horizons for different individuals in relation to random assign-
ment. Indeed, for a relevant share of our sample (65% of ND25+ and 59% of NDLP eligibles), 
2004/05 fiscal year earnings partially cover pre-treatment periods (see Figure 1). Nonetheless, there 
is scope to use this administrative information for sensitivity analyses of survey-based estimates. 
All our outcomes of interest – employment probabilities and durations, and earnings – are re-
lated to labour market performance. As listed in Table 2, we have put together an extensive collec-
tion of individual, office and local area characteristics that are most likely to affect individuals’ la-
bour market outcomes, and that might potentially have affected selection into the ERA sample. 
Note that all of these variables have to be defined both for the ERA study participants and non-
participants, which required us to derive such information from administrative data sources alone.  
In addition to demographic characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, partner and children, disabil-
ity and illness), we have summarised information on an individual’s current unemployment spell, 
including in particular indicators of a very recent/current employment spell, how long it took them 
to start the Gateway or volunteer for NDLP once having become mandatory for it or being told  
 17




Table 2 Summary of observed characteristics  
ERA district   
Inflow month  District-specific month from random assignment start when the individual 
started the ND25 Gateway or volunteered for NDLP 
Demographics Gender, age, ethnic minority, disability, partner (ND25+), number of chil-
dren (NDLP), age of youngest child (NDLP) 
Current spell Not on benefits at inflow (NDLP), employed at inflow (indicator of very 
recent/current employment), time to show up (defined as the time between 
becoming mandatory for ND25+ and starting the Gateway or between be-
ing told about NDLP and volunteering for it), early entrant into ND25+ 
program (Spent <540 days on JSA before entering ND25+) 
Labour market history 
(3 years pre-inflow) 
Past participation in basic skills, past participation in voluntary programs 
(number of previous spells on: NDLP, New Deal for Musicians, New Deal 
Innovation Fund, New Deal for Disabled People, WBLA or Outreach), 
past participation in ND25+; 
Active benefit history (JSA and compensation from NDYP, ND25+, Em-
ployment Zones and WBLA and Basic Skills), inactive benefit history 
(Income Support and Incapacity Benefits), employment history: 
(1) parsimonious summary 
(2) monthly employment dummies  
(3) dummies for sequences of employment/benefits/neither states  
(4) dummies for ever employed in 12m window at any time in the past 
Local conditions Total New Deal caseload at office, share of lone parents in New Deal 
caseload at office, quintiles of the index of multiple deprivation, local un-
employment rate 
 
about it, and of whether ND25+ entrants volunteered for the Gateway ahead of time. We have also 
created variables capturing the extent of past participation in voluntary employment programs (as a 
crude indicator of willingness to improve one’s circumstances), in the ND25+ (a mandatory pro-
gram) and in Basic Skills (a program designed to address basic literacy, numeracy and IT skills).  
We have further constructed three years’ worth of labour market history in terms of time in em-
ployment, on active benefits (JSA and compensation whilst on a labour market program) and on 
inactive benefits (Income Support and Incapacity Benefits). As highlighted in the table, we experi-
mented with different ways of capturing these histories. The parsimonious ‘summary’ consists of a 
series of dummy variables capturing the proportion of time employed (zero, less than 25%, 25 to 
50%, more than 50%) and the proportion spent on benefits (zero, less than 50%, more than 50%, 
100%)s, separately on active and inactive benefits. ‘Employment dummies’ are 36 monthly dummy 
variables indicating whether the individual had a positive number of days employed at any time 
during each of the 36 months pre-inflow. The ‘sequence dummies’ follow Card and Sullivan (1988) 
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in building a series of dummy variables, each capturing a labour market sequence over the past 3 
years.
26
 As it turned out, though the specific combinations differ for the two intake groups, the first 
22 (out of 48) combinations cover in both cases exactly 90% of the sample. Lastly, a series of 
dummies for being ‘ever employed’ during a 12-month window at any time in the past (specifically, 
between 1+k and 12+k months pre-inflow, with k=0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24). 
The Census has provided us with information on local labour market conditions (travel-to-work 
area unemployment rates) and on the deprivation of the area the individual lives in (index of local 
deprivation). We have also constructed information at the office level (total New Deal caseload and 
share of lone parents in such caseload), aimed at capturing office-specific characteristics that might 
impact on the probability of participation in the study as well as on subsequent outcomes. 
Despite offering such rich and detailed information, the administrative data do not contain in-
formation on education, which thus remains an unobservable, together with “innate ability” or work 
commitment. The previous literature has however indicated the potential for detailed and flexibly 
modelled labour market histories (like those we have constructed) to help proxy such unobserved 
traits and thus to eliminate much of the selection bias (see e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, Heckman 
and Smith, 1999, Heckman et al., 1998, Heckman et al., 1999, and Frölich, 2004, and to some ex-
tent Hotz et al., 2005). Recent work by Dolton and Smith (2011) has however qualified this claim. 
While finding support for the widely recognised importance of controlling for pre-program outcome 
measures – and to do so in a flexible way – in order to reduce selection bias, they claim that even 
then important unobservables have remained unaccounted for. These conclusions were reached by 
noting how much their non-experimental impact estimates change: conditioning on histories in a 
flexible rather than parsimonious way reduces impact estimates to more a priori ‘reasonable’ val-
ues, and further conditioning on a number of survey measures of attitudes towards work for a subset 
of their sample has a large effect on the impact estimates, highlighting how even flexibly modelled 
histories did not fully capture these otherwise unobserved factors (for more details see Appendix A5).  
We are in a position to assess the validity of both conjectures in a more formal way, as the spe-
cific nature of our set-up and data – randomisation coupled with administrative outcome data for the 
non-participants – allows us to perform a number of tests not generally available. The sensitivity 
tests outlined below lend themselves to formally quantify how much selection bias is reduced by 
controlling for detailed as opposed to parsimonious histories, as well as whether controlling for his-
tories is indeed enough to remove all selection bias.  
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 The sequence is defined according to status over 3 adjacent periods. For ND25+: 1 to 18 months (most would be on 
JSA); 19 to 27 months and 28 to 36 month pre-inflow. For NDPL: 1 to 12 months, 13 to 24 months and 25 to 36 months 
pre-inflow. State can be in the first period: always on benefits, employed for at least one month, anything else; in the 
second period: always on benefits, employed for at least 5 months, no employment and no benefits for at least 5 months, 
anything else; and in the third period: always on benefits, employed for at least 5 months, no employment and no bene-
fits always, anything else. 
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4.4 Descriptive analysis 
As seen in Section 3.2, the incidence of non-participation can be viewed as the causal effect of ran-
domisation on participation. Table 3 shows that as to incidence, non-participation overall was lower 
amongst ND25+ (23%) than NDLP entrants (over 30%). In terms of composition, 9% of all ND25+ 
eligibles have been diverted and 14% formally refused. By contrast, over one quarter (26.4%) of all 
eligible NDLP entrants appear to have been diverted, while only 4% formally refused.  
 
Table 3: Breakdown by district (%) 













All 23.0 9.4 13.6 30.4 26.4 4.0 
Scotland 8.7 0.0 8.7 5.3 2.5 2.8 
NE England 34.9 8.8 26.1 29.2 28.2 1.0 
NW England 14.6 0.0 14.6 6.2 2.5 3.7 
Wales 20.7 9.6 11.1 23.6 20.1 3.6 
East Midlands 27.5 16.8 10.7 47.1 41.2 5.9 
London 25.8 14.8 11.1 31.0 26.1 4.9 
 
There was also marked variation in the incidence and composition of non-participation accord-
ing to ERA district, with some clear outliers in terms of performance. In the East Midlands almost 
half of all eligible NDLP entrants did not take part in ERA, most of whom were diverted customers. 
The performance of Scotland and North West England is particularly remarkable, with not one sin-
gle diverted customer among the ND25+ group, while North East England stands out with over one 
quarter of the ND25+ eligible population being formal refusers.  
Goodman and Sianesi (2007) uncovered a very strong role of office affiliation in determining 
both ERA offer and consenting choice, though as expected it was stronger in the former. Most of 
the explained variation in ERA offer, acceptance and participation was accounted for by an individ-
ual’s district, office affiliation and inflow month
27
, underscoring the key role played by local prac-
tices. Individual employment prospects, as well as attitudes towards and past participation in gov-
ernment programs were however also found to matter, leaving only a residual role to demographic 
characteristics (see also Appendix Table A1). 
In the absence of selective differences in outcome-relevant characteristics, the control group 
and the non-participants should experience similar outcomes, as neither of them has been offered 
ERA services. However, Goodman and Sianesi (2007) have found non-participants to be somewhat 
higher performers than participants in terms of labour market outcomes among NDLP entrants, but 
to have considerably worse employment outcomes among ND25+ entrants. 
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 Over time, formal refusal rates fell for both intake groups, likely reflecting increased adviser experience in selling 
ERA and the permission to mention ERA financial incentives. 
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5. Methodological approaches 
5.1 Analysis framework 
The population of interest are those eligible to be offered ERA services and incentives, i.e. all New 
Deal entrants in the six evaluation districts over the intake window. We implicitly condition on this 
population throughout. The binary variable Q captures selection into the ERA study: Q=0 denotes 
those individuals who despite being eligible have not been randomly assigned (these are the com-
pliers of Section 3.2, made up of the diverted customers and formal refusers), and Q=1 denotes the 
ERA study participants (the always-takers). The participants make up the experimental sample 
which was randomly assigned between a program group who was offered ERA (R=1) and a control 
group who was not (R=0). The problem to be addressed is changes in participation patterns intro-
duced by the experimental evaluation, given that due to diversion and refusal to be randomly as-
signed, the population under the experiment (Q=1) does not correspond to the eligible population, 
made up by the (Q=1) and (Q=0) groups. 
Further, let S denote the availability of a survey-based outcome measure conditional on ERA 
participation. Specifically, S=1 when survey outcomes such as earnings are observed. This happens 
only for that subsample of participants who (1) were randomly selected to be surveyed, (2) could be 
contacted, (3) accepted to take the survey and (4) answered the earnings question. For short, we re-
fer to them as “respondents”. ERA participants with missing survey outcome information (S=0), 
whatever the reason, are referred to as “non-respondents”. 
Let p ≡ P(Q=0) be the probability of non-participation among the eligibles (or the causal effect 
of randomisation on participation), which is directly identified in the data (see Table 1). 
Denote the observed outcome by Y and define two potential outcomes for each eligible individ-
ual i: Y1i the outcome if i were offered ERA services and Y0i the outcome if i were not offered ERA 
services. Potential outcomes represented this way are (a) invoking SUTVA
28
, (b) not affected by 
participation in the ERA study (Y1Qi = Y1i and Y0Qi = Y0i for Q=0, 1) and (c) not affected by ran-
domisation per se (Yki(RCT=1) = Yki(RCT=0) = Yki for k=0,1 – as justified in Section 3.1). 
Our parameter of interest (see also Section 2.1) is the average treatment effect (ATE) of offer-
ing ERA on the full ERA eligible population in the six districts, defined as the average outcome for 
all those eligible for ERA if they were offered ERA services compared to the average outcome for 
all those eligible for ERA if they were not offered ERA services: ATE ≡ E(Y1 – Y0).  
Denote the average impact of ERA on the participants by ATE1 ≡ E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=1) and on the 
non-participants by ATE0 ≡ E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=0). The three impacts are then linked according to: 
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 The stable unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA, Rubin, 1980) requires that an individual’s potential outcomes 
as well as treatment choice do not depend on the treatment choices of other individuals in the population. The former 
rules out general equilibrium effects in the ERA study, the latter is satisfied in the experiment. 
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ATE = (1–p)⋅ATE1 + p⋅ATE0.                                        (2) 
The parameter of interest ATE is thus given by a weighted average of the mean impact on par-
ticipants and of the average impact that the non-participants would have experienced, with weights 
given by the relative share of participants and non-participants within the eligible pool. 
Under some conditions (randomisation has not disrupted the program, there has been no control 
group substitution and outcomes are observed for all or a random sample of the participants), the 
available experimental data identifies ATE1, the effect of ERA for participants in the experiment, as 
due to the randomness of R within the Q=1 group we have: 
ATE1 ≡ E(Y1|Q=1) – E(Y0|Q=1) = E(Y1|Q=1, R=1) – E(Y0|Q=1, R=0) = E(Y|R=1) – E(Y|R=0). 
By contrast, ATE0 and hence ATE are unobserved. Following on from the discussion in Section 
3.2, we define randomisation bias to be present if the average effect for the study participants is dif-
ferent from the average effect that the full eligible population would have experienced had ERA 
been implemented in routine mode, that is if:  ATE1 ≠ ATE. 
We discuss how to assess and deal with randomisation bias in experimental studies when fol-
low-up information on the outcomes of the non-participants is available (administrative outcomes – 
Section 5.2) and when it is not (survey outcomes – Section 5.3), in both situations considering con-
tinuous as well as discrete outcomes. 
 
5.2 Follow-up data on the non-participants (administrative outcomes) 
In case of administrative data on the outcomes of all eligibles, ATE1 is identified by the experimen-
tal contrast and recovering ATE0 is akin to recovering the average treatment effect on the non-
treated (ATNT), given that, as in the standard case, the no-treatment outcome of the non-treated (i.e. 
the non-participants) is observed. Equation (2) thus becomes: 
ATE = (1–p)⋅ATE1 + p⋅{E(Y1 | Q=0) – E(Y | Q=0)}.                 (3) 
As in a typical matching context, to estimate ATE0 and hence ATE, we thus only need to iden-
tify E(Y1 | Q=0), the average outcome that the non-participants would have experienced had they 
been offered ERA services. The conditional independence assumption (CIA)
29
 that allows us to di-
rectly identify this missing counterfactual is that given observed attributes X, non-participants 
would have experienced the same average ERA outcome as participants: 
 (CIA-1) E(Y1 | Q=0, X) = E(Y1 | Q=1, X). 
To give (CIA-1) empirical content, we require common support, i.e. overlap in the distribution 
of the observed characteristics X between participants and non-participants: 
(CS)  P(Q=1 | X)>0    for all X in the support of the eligibles. 
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 Known also as selection-on-observables, unconfoundedness, ignorability or exogeneity. For a recent review of meth-
ods relying on this assumption, see Imbens (2004). 
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Specifically, the experimental evaluation cannot provide estimates of the impact of ERA for in-
dividuals with observed characteristics X  if no participant displays those values. Thus although 
there may be eligibles with characteristics X , if selection into the ERA experiment is such that no-
body with characteristics X  is participates in the ERA study so that P(Q=1| X )=0, the effect for this 
subset of eligibles is not non-parametrically identified. 
Under random assignment (RA) and (CIA-1), identification of E(Y1 | Q=0) is straightforward: 
E(Y1 | Q=0) = E[E(Y1 | Q=0, X) | Q=0] =(CIA-1)= E[E(Y1 | Q=1, X) | Q=0] 
         =(RA)= EX[E(Y1 | R=1, X) | Q=0] =(CS)= EX[E(Y | R=1, X) | Q=0], 
where (CS) ensures that there are participants (program group members) for each X for which there 
are non-participants, so that the last term can be estimated from the data. 
As for implementation, each non-participant can be matched to one or more similar program 
group member(s) based on the propensity score p(X) ≡ P(Q=0 | X). 
Compared to standard OLS regression, matching methods are non-parametric, allowing both 
ERA impacts and non-ERA outcomes to depend on observables in arbitrary ways. They addition-
ally highlight the actual comparability of groups by offering ways to assess balancing of observ-
ables between matched samples. Like OLS, however, they rule out selection on unobservables. Due 
to our unique set-up we are however in a position to perform some tests in respect to the latter. 
Specifically, consider the CIA in terms of non-ERA outcomes: 
 (CIA-0) E(Y0 | Q=0, X) = E(Y0 | Q=1, X). 
This condition is not needed for identification, given that – as is the case for the ATNT – we do 
observe the non-ERA outcomes of the non-participants. However – and in contrast to the standard 
ATNT case – randomisation allows us to directly test (CIA-0), i.e. that the non-ERA outcomes of 
the non-participants are the same, on average, as those of observationally equivalent participants. 
This test is implemented by testing whether E(Y | Q=0, X) = E(Y | R=0, X), i.e. whether once con-
trolling for observables, the non-participants and the control group (a representative sample of the 
participants for whom non-ERA outcomes are observed) experience the same average outcome.
30
 
This test can be performed by running a regression, on the pooled sample of controls and non-
participants, of observed outcome on the observables, plus a dummy variable for participation in the 
ERA study. To minimise all sensitivity to the specification of how the observables should enter the 
outcome equation and affect differences between the two groups, one can instead perform matching 
(matching to each non-participant one or more similar control group member) and test for the equal-
ity of mean outcomes of the two matched groups. If in the comparison of the outcomes of these two 
                                                 
 
30
 The test set-up can further be used to guide the choice of matching method as well as of how to summarise the ob-
servables, in particular labour market histories. The idea is to calibrate such decisions on balancing observed outcomes 
between non-participants and matched controls. 
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groups there remain statistically significant differences conditional on the observables, this provides 
evidence of residual selection based on unobserved characteristics related to no-treatment outcomes.  
Were we to reject the CIA in terms of Y0, how would this relate to the plausibility of our identi-
fying assumption of the CIA in terms of Y1? We discuss this issue separately for continuous and for 
discrete outcomes. 
 
5.2.1 Dealing with selection on unobserved characteristics: Continuous outcomes  
To better understand how (CIA-1) and (CIA-0) relate to one another, note that from the definition 
of impacts β ≡ Y1 – Y0, we have that Y1 = Y0 + β, so that (CIA-1) is equivalent to assuming: 
(CIA-0) E(Y0 | Q=0, X) = E(Y0 | Q=1, X)      and 
(CIA-β) E(β | Q=0, X)   = E(β | Q=1, X). 
Assumption (CIA-1) is thus made up of two assumptions: no residual selection into the ERA 
study based on unobserved characteristics affecting non-ERA outcomes (CIA-0) and no residual 
selection into the study based on unobserved idiosyncratic realised impact components (CIA-β).  
If one were to assume (CIA-β), (CIA-1) and (CIA-0) would thus imply each other. 
This can also be seen in a more parametric model for observed outcomes which allows impacts 
to be heterogeneous across individuals in both observable b(Xi) and unobservable bi dimensions
31
: 
Yi = m(Xi) + {b(Xi)·Ri}·Qi + {bi·Ri}·Qi + ui.                 (4) 
In this model, (CIA-1) amounts to (ui, bi) ⊥ Qi | Xi, and thus requires conditional independence 
to hold both in terms of Y0-relevant unobserved characteristics u (no “omitted variable bias”; CIA-
0) and in terms of unobserved idiosyncratic impacts b (no Roy model; CIA-β).
32
  
Under (CIA-β), one can thus directly test the validity of the standard (CIA-1) assumption by 
testing (CIA-0); additionally, if (CIA-0) – and hence (CIA-1) – fail, one can correct the matching 
estimates from selection bias. To see how, note that under (CIA-β) the unobserved counterfactual 
conditional on X can be written as: 
E(Y1 | Q=0, X)  =(CIA-β)= E(Y1 | Q=1, X) + {E(Y0 | Q=0, X) – E(Y0 | Q=1, X)}  
 =  E(Y | R=1, X)  + {E(Y | Q=0, X) – E(Y | R=0, X)}. 
       The ERA counterfactual for non-participants with characteristics X is thus identified by the av-
erage ERA outcome of program group members with the same X – the conditional matching esti-
mate under (CIA-1) – plus a correction term that reflects a potential failure of (CIA-0) and captures 
by how much non-participants and participants with the same value of X still differ in terms of their 
average non-ERA outcome. It then follows that: 
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 The model reflects the fact that a participating (Q=1) individual receives the impact only with a 50-50 chance (i.e. if 
randomised into the program group). 
32
 The distinction between selection on unobserved characteristics and selection on unobserved impacts is at the heart of 
Heckman et al. (1999), who highlight important implications of violations of either assumption for the properties of 
standard evaluation methods. 
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E(Y1 | Q=0) = EX[E(Y | R=1, X) | Q=0] + {E(Y | Q=0) – EX[E(Y | R=0, X) | Q=0]}. 
A violation of (CIA-0) thus introduces an overall bias term in the matching estimate of the av-
erage ERA outcome for the non-participants based on the average observed ERA outcome of obser-
vationally equivalent participants. In our set-up this bias term is identified in the data.  
The expression for the average impact for the non-participants simplifies to: 
ATE0 = EX[E(Y | R=1, X) | Q=0] – EX[E(Y | R=0, X) | Q=0].                     (5) 
Estimation can be carried out by matching the non-participants twice, once to the program 
group and once to the control group, imposing common support across both terms. 
Conceptually, one can arrive at the estimator in (5) in two ways. One, as done so far, is by di-
rectly focusing on the only unidentified term in equation (3), E(Y1|Q=0), invoke the corresponding 
(CIA-1) assumption and correcting, under (CIA-β), for any bias in terms of no-treatment outcomes. 
There is an interesting parallel between this way of proceeding and the standard difference-in-
differences estimator, as in both cases an identifying assumption on the difference (idiosyncratic 
impact or trend conditional on X) is made to correct for an observed violation of such an assumption 
on the level (see Appendix A2 for more details). The other way is to ignore that only part of the 
ATE0 needs to be identified, and directly identify ATE0 under (CIA-β):  
ATE0 =(CIA-β)= EX[E(Y1–Y0|Q=1,X) | Q=0] =(RA)= EX[E(Y|R=1,X)|Q=0] – EX[E(Y|R=0, X)|Q=0].
33
 
Either way, the ultimately identifying assumption is (CIA-β); in Section 5.4 we argue its plau-
sibility in the ERA experiment. 
 
5.2.2 Dealing with selection on unobserved characteristics: Binary outcomes  
The ways to deal with violations of (CIA-0) based on invoking (CIA-β) we have examined so far 
would not be appropriate for a binary outcome, as there would be (negative) dependence between 
base levels (Y0) and differences (Y1–Y0). We could now interpret model (4) as a linear probability 
model, where the probability of, say, being employed is modelled as a linear function of a set of co-
variates including the offer of ERA support. This linear specification is however controversial, as 
linearity in the error term is particularly unrealistic for outcome variables with bounded support and 
predictions from the model cannot be guaranteed to fall within the 0-1 interval. 
An alternative way to proceed proposed by Blundell et al. (2004) for their difference-in-
differences analysis is to focus instead on latent dependent variables within the popular index mod-
els, and to assume linearity in the index. Following this idea, we can explore the potential of speci-
fying our CIA-type assumptions on the latent variable Y
* 
which determines observed employment 
                                                 
 
33
 Indeed, one could further ignore that only (part of) the ATE0 needs to be identified and identify under (CIA-β) the 
ATE directly: ATE =(CIA-β)= EX[E(Y1–Y0|Q=1,X)] =(RA)= EX[E(Y|R=1,X)] – EX[E(Y|R=0,X)]. Estimation of the ATE 
can then be carried out by matching the eligibles twice, once to the program group and once to the control group. This is 
not the most efficient way to proceed, however, as it implicitly involves extra matching steps to estimate the 
experimentally available ATE1 (with E(Y | R=k) being estimated by EX[E(Y | R=k, X) | Q=1] for k=0,1). 
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status Y according to: Yi = 1(Yi
 *
>0). We can now think of applying model (4) to Y
*
, modelling an 
individual’s underlying, or latent, employability as a function of many factors (like skills, fixed 
costs for instance in terms of young children, etc), among which is the offer of ERA support (R·Q):  
Yi
*
 = m(Xi) + {b(Xi)·Ri}·Qi + {bi·Ri}·Qi + ui.                   (4
*
) 
To extend to a non-linear setting our approach for dealing with randomisation bias, we thus fol-
low what Blundell and Costa Dias (2009) and Lechner (2011) suggest for difference-in-differences 
models for a binary outcome.  
Specifically, let the potential outcome equations be: 
Y0 = 1(Y0
*
>0)  and  Y1 = 1(Y1
*
>0). 
We are thus assuming that the conditional expectation of the binary potential outcome variables 
is related to the conditional expectation of the latent outcome variables in the following way: 
E(Y0 | Q, X) = H[E(Y0
* 
| Q, X)] and   E(Y0
*




| Q, X)] 
E(Y1 | Q, X) = H[E(Y1
* 
| Q, X)] and   E(Y1
*




| Q, X)], 
where the function H(.) is assumed to be strictly monotonously increasing and invertible. H plays 
the role of a typical link function, which e.g. in a Probit model would be the cumulative standard 
normal distribution function Φ. 
Just as these authors assume the difference-in-differences identifying assumption of common 
trends at the level of the expectations of the latent no-treatment outcome variable, we now invoke 
our CIA assumptions at the level of the expectations of the latent potential outcome variables. 





 | Q=1, X) = E(Y1
*
 | Q=0, X)  
which holds if and only if (CIA-1), i.e. E(Y1
 
| Q=1, X) = E(Y1
 
| Q=0, X), holds.  
Given that E(Y1
 
| Q=1, X) = E(Y
 
| R=1, X), under (CIA-1
*
) we can then proceed fully non-
parametrically the way done for continuous outcomes and recover the missing treatment counterfac-
tual for the non-participants by matching them to observationally similar program group members.  
We could alternatively use a Probit model. In this case, H = Φ and E(Y | X=x, D=d) = Φ(x’θd). 
Under this parametric version of (CIA-1
*
) we would then estimate the counterfactual as:  
E(Y1 | Q=0) = ∑ Φ(′	
) 	{) . 





 | Q=1, X) = E(Y0
*
 | Q=0 X)  








| Q=0, X)],  
which holds if and only if (CIA-0), i.e. E(Y0
 
| Q=1, X) = E(Y0
 
| Q=0, X), holds.  
The test for (CIA-0
*
) is thus equivalent to the one for (CIA-0). As for continuous outcomes, 
testing whether E(Y
 
|R=0,X) = E(Y|Q=0,X) can thus be performed non-parametrically via matching. 
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Alternatively, we can assume a Probit model and test whether E(Y | X=x,R=0) = E(Y | X=x,Q=0) by 
testing whether Φ(x’θR=0) = Φ(x’θQ=0). 
So far we have shown that, as expected, moving to latent variables does not change the estima-
tor under (CIA-1) or the testing strategy for (CIA-0) that were discussed before Section 5.2.1. Both 
of these are non-parametric in nature and thus apply to either continuous or binary outcomes, the 
only difference is that in the latter case one might wish to implement a parametric Probit version. 





In particular, we will no longer be able to implement the estimator for discrete outcomes with cor-
rection (or, equivalently, directly) under (CIA-β
*
) using non-parametric methods.
34
 




), noting how 
(CIA-1
*
) is equivalent to (CIA-0
*
) and (CIA- β
*
), the latter ruling out selection into the ERA study 
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) amounts to E(u | Q, X) = E(u |X), (CIA-β
*
) 
to E(b | Q, X) = E(b |X) and (CIA-1
*
) to E(u | Q, X) = E(u |X) and E(b | Q, X) = E(b |X). 
So if we assume (CIA-β
*
), failure of (CIA-0
*





) to show the missing counterfactual, we have: 
E(Y1
*
 | Q=0, X) = E(Y1
*
 | Q=1, X) + {E(Y0
*
 | Q=0, X) – E(Y0
*
 | Q=1, X)}, which is equivalent to 
H
-1
[E(Y1 | Q=0, X)]  = H
-1
[E(Y1 | Q=1, X)] + H
-1
[E(Y0 | Q=0, X)] – H
-1
[E(Y0 | Q=1, X)]  
 = H
-1
[E(Y | R=1, X)]   + H
-1
[E(Y | Q=0, X)]  – H
-1
[E(Y | R=0, X)]. 
Hence: 
E(Y1 | Q=0, X) = H{ H
-1
[E(Y | R=1, X)] +  H
-1
[E(Y  | Q=0, X)] – H
-1
[E(Y  | R=0, X)] }. 
Assuming a Probit model we obtain: 






(Φ(x’θR=0))}= Φ(x’θR=1 + x’θQ=0 – x’θR=0).  
So that, under (CIA-β
*
): 
E(Y1 | Q=0) = ∑ Φ(′	
			) 	{) . 
It is straightforward to show that (a) assuming (CIA-β
*
) and imposing the correction to the 
ATE0 identified under (CIA-1
*
) leads to exactly the same result as imposing (CIA-β
*
) straight away, 
and (b) if (CIA-0
*
) holds, results under parametric-(CIA-1
*
) and under (CIA-β
*
) coincide. 
Note that all three estimators for binary outcomes only differ in how they estimate the missing 
counterfactual E(Y1|Q=0); the corresponding ATE0 is then estimated by subtracting the observed 
average outcome of the non-participants. In the non-linear case, the observed no-treatment outcome 
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 This is another parallel with difference-in-differences models, which are functional form dependent (see e.g. the dis-
cussion in Lechner, 2011). 
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of the non-participants no longer cancels out as was the case for the bias-corrected estimator for the 
ATE0 with a continuous outcome in (5). Table 4 summarises all our estimators for ATE0. 
 
Table 4: Estimators for ATE0 for binary and continuous administrative outcomes 









ATE0 = ∑ Φ(′	





ATE0 = ∑ Φ(′	
	′	′	) 	{) – E(Y | Q=0) 
Non-parametric (CIA-β) 
ATE0 = E[E(Y | R=1, X) | Q=0] – E[E(Y | R=0, X) | Q=0]     
 
 
5.3 No follow-up data on the non-participants (survey outcomes) 
In some situations only survey outcome information might be available; in the case of ERA, admin-
istrative earnings became available only later on in the evaluation. Even then, administrative earn-
ings have a much less clean definition, both as some components are not captured and as they per-
tain to different amounts of time on the program for different individuals; indeed for a subgroup of 
the eligibles such information is pre-treatment (see Section 4.3). 
Focus on survey outcomes raises two additional issues: not only treatment but now also no-
treatment outcomes of the non-participants are unobserved, and in the presence of non-random sur-
vey/item non-response among participants, ATE1 itself will in general be unobserved. In case of 
survey outcomes, only p is directly identified in equation (1): ATE = (1–p)⋅ATE1 + p⋅ATE0.   
What is also identified in the data is the experimental contrast on the responding participants, 
∆S=1 ≡ E(Y | S=1,R=1) – E(Y | S=1,R=0), which will not necessarily be equal to ATE1. 
This problem is akin to attrition and involves reweighting the outcomes of the responding par-
ticipants (responding program and control groups) on the basis of the characteristics X of the full 
eligible group (i.e. full program group, full control group and non-participants) to make them repre-
sentative – in terms of observables X – of the full eligible population.
35
 
Assume that, once conditioning on observables X, eligibles do not select into the ERA study 
based on their realised idiosyncratic unobserved impact component: 
(CIA-β) E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=1, X) = E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=0, X)    
We allow for selective non-response, provided selection into the responding sample happens 
only in terms of observable characteristics: 
                                                 
 
35
 See Wooldridge (2002) for weighting estimators to deal with incidental truncation problems such as attrition under 
the CIA and Huber (2012) for weighting estimators to deal with different forms of attrition in randomised experiments. 
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(NR) E(Y1 | R=1, S=1, X) = E(Y1 | R=1, S=0, X)  and 
 E(Y0 | R=0, S=1, X) = E(Y0 | R=0, S=0, X)     
Assumption (NR) rules out selection on outcome-relevant unobservables into responding to the 
earnings question given random assignment status. In other words, conditional on random assign-
ment status and characteristics X, non-response is unrelated to potential outcomes, i.e. program 
(control) group members with characteristics X who respond and who don’t respond would experi-
ence on average the same ERA (non-ERA) outcome. 
Under random assignment (RA), (CIA-β) and (NR), identification of ATE is achieved as
36
: 
ATE  ≡ E(Y1 – Y0) = E[E(Y1 – Y0 | X)] =(CIA-β)= E[E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=1, X)]  
 =(RA)= E[E(Y1 | R=1, X)] – E[E(Y0 | R=0, X)]  
 =(NR)= E[E(Y1 | R=1, S=1, X)] – E[E(Y0 | R=0, S=1, X)]  
 = E[E(Y | R=1, S=1, X)] – E[E(Y | R=0, S=1, X)]               (6) 
To derive the empirical counterpart we consider weighting and matching estimators. The for-
mer directly weights the outcomes of the (responding) participants so as to reflect the distribution of 
observables in the original eligible population (see Appendix A3 for the derivation): 
ATE = E[ω1(X)·S·R·Y – ω0(X)·S·(1–R)·Y],   where 
() ≡ ()(|)
 |(,|)
 |,"(,|,)        for k=0, 1   
Alternatively, the weights can be constructed via matching
37
, with the advantages that the exact 
specifications of the propensity score and response probabilities are not needed and that one can 
assess the extent of the actual comparability achieved between groups. 
 
5.3.1 Binary outcomes 
Whilst we do not consider survey-based binary outcomes in our empirical analysis, this section 
highlights the main issues involved in the identification of ATE in such a situation. 
We keep the assumptions (NR) on non-response. In this non-linear case, however, the (CIA-β) 
assumption made on the latent outcome variables, (CIA-β
*
), is not enough for identification, as the 
latent model does not extend to the difference in potential outcomes. Instead, we need to invoke a 







 | Q, X) = E(Y0
*
 | X) and 
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 An alternative set of assumptions to (RA) and (NR) yielding the same expression for the ATE are the external validity 
of the impact for respondents given X, E(Y1–Y0|Q=1,X) = E(Y1–Y0|Q=1,S=1,X), and that random assignment keeps hold-
ing given X within the responding sample, E(Yk|S=1,R=1,X) = E(Yk|S=1,R=0,X) for k=0,1.  
37
 To derive the terms E[E(Y | R=k, S=1, X)] for k=0,1, match each eligible individual in the Q=0 and Q=1 groups, to 
individuals in the subgroup of responding R=k members and calculate the weight that gets assigned to each individual in 
the latter subgroup (this weight will be larger than one). Reweigh the outcomes in the latter subgroup using these 
weights and take their average over this subgroup, i.e. use the matched outcome to estimate E(Yk). One can match on 






 | Q, X) = E(Y1
*
 | X)  
Consider the average conditional no-treatment latent outcome: 
E(Y0
*




 | Q=1, X) = H
-1
[E(Y0 | Q=1, X)] =(RA)= H
-1
[E(Y0  | R=0, X)]  
 =(NR)= H
-1
[E(Y0 | R=0, S=1, X)] = H
-1
[E(Y | R=0, S=1, X)]  
Hence, H
-1
[E(Y0 | X)] = H
-1
[E(Y | R=0, S=1, X)], or E(Y0 | X) = E(Y | R=0, S=1, X).  
Assuming H = Φ for a Probit model, we obtain that E(Y0 | X) = Φ(x’θR=0,S=1). 
Similarly, under (CIA-1
*
), (RA) and (NR) we obtain that E(Y1 | X) = Φ(x’θR=1,S=1). 
The conditional ATE is thus identified as ATE(X) = Φ(x’θR=1,S=1) – Φ(x’θR=0,S=1), and the ATE 
as: 
#$% = 1' ( 	{)∪{)
{Φ(,′./,0) − Φ(,′./,0)) 
The corresponding estimator for continuous outcomes in (6) only needed to invoke (CIA-β) and 
could rely on fully non-parametric methods (e.g. first and second terms estimated via matching). 
 
5.3.2 Sensitivity analysis 
We have proposed exploiting the experiment to test for the presence of unobserved characteristics 
driving selection into the ERA study when outcome data is available for all eligibles. While this is 
not the case for survey outcomes, in the ERA evaluation we can nonetheless consider two specific 
subgroups for whom some robustness analysis can meaningfully be carried out.  
The “post-April group” is made up of those eligibles who started the New Deal or ERA from 
April 2004 onwards. For these individuals, representing 35% of ND25+ and 41% of NDLP eligi-
bles, the 2004/05 fiscal year administrative earnings data represent outcomes (see Figure 1). This 
group thus offers the chance to carry out the (CIA-0) test in terms of (administrative) earnings. Ad-
ditionally, it can be used to glean guidance on how best to construct the set of matching variables X, 
as the way of summarising labour market histories that produces the best balancing in the (CIA-0) 
test can then be used in the weighting and matching estimators for survey earnings. Of course, both 
uses of this subgroup potentially suffer from an issue of external validity. 
The “March-May group” is made up of those eligibles who started the New Deal or ERA 
around the start of the 2004/05 tax year, which we approximate as the three months March to May 
2004. For these individuals, representing 25% of both ND25+ and NDLP eligibles, tax year 
2004/05 earnings closely correspond to earnings in the 1-year follow up period, in that they cover 
(roughly) the same horizon (see Figure 1). This subgroup too lends itself to testing (CIA-0) on ad-
ministrative earnings.
38
 Furthermore, under the weak assumption (CIA-β), we could take the ATE 
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 Before considering non-participation, one can focus on the experimental March-May sample and (after having 
checked that, as one would expect, randomisation still holds, i.e. at least the observables are balanced between the pro-
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for this group in terms of administrative earnings as the ‘truth’, and check against it the perform-
ance of the proposed matching and weighting estimators for survey-measured earnings, which in 
addition to selection into the study have to deal with non-response. Specifically, we can compare 
the ATE estimate for the March-May group in terms of administrative earnings to the ATE estimate 
for the March-May group in terms of survey earnings, which was derived from its responding sub-
group taking account of non-response. While potentially informative, this sensitivity check might at 
best provide corroborative evidence. First, while the subgroup was chosen to align the horizons over 
which the two types of earnings are measured, nothing can be done to force the two measures to 
capture exactly the same components
39
 (though some evidence can be gleaned from test (B) in foot-
note 38). Additionally, there could once again be external validity issues in extending any conclu-
sion from the May-March group to the full sample. Finally, implementation-wise the group might 
be too small to allow one to discriminate with enough precision between different estimates. Wid-
ening the temporal window beyond three months to define a larger group would yield a gain in pre-
cision but also result in increasingly different horizons covered by administrative and survey earn-
ings, reflecting the standard trade-off between bias and variability. 
 
5.4 Plausibility of the identifying assumption 
As seen for both continuous and binary outcomes, irrespective of whether (CIA-0
(*)
) holds, the im-
pact of ERA for all eligibles can be identified under (CIA-β
(*)
). It is thus critical to discuss the plau-
sibility of the assumption that participation in the ERA study was not based on realised unobserved 
idiosyncratic ERA impacts. 
There is scant empirical evidence as to the extent to which unemployed job-seekers and their 
advisers are ex ante able to systematically predict the individual realised unobserved idiosyncratic 
impacts from a labour market program. All the available evidence, however, points to the insur-
mountable difficulties individuals face in estimating counterfactuals (indeed not just ex ante, but 
even ex post). Specifically, Smith et al. (2013) find that ex post participant evaluations are unrelated 
to the econometric impact estimates. As to caseworkers, Bell and Orr (2002) find that their ex ante 
evaluations of which participant will benefit most from the program have no predictive content, 
while Frölich (2001) and Lechner and Smith (2007) find that caseworkers’ program allocation 
choices fail to maximize participants’ subsequent employment prospects. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
gram and control March-May subgroups) compare the experimental contrast in terms of administrative earnings for the 
survey respondents among the March-May group to (A) the experimental impact estimate in terms of administrative 
earnings for the full March-May group in order to assess non-response bias (for the March-May group) in terms of 
characteristics that affect administrative earnings; and to (B) the experimental contrast in terms of survey earnings for 
the respondents among the March-May group in order to garner evidence on whether administrative and survey earn-
ings essentially measure the same impact despite not necessarily covering the same components. 
39
 Indeed, administrative and survey earnings measures often differ substantially even when they nominally capture 
exactly the same components of earnings (see the discussion in the Bound et al. (2001). 
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As for the specific ERA set-up, drawing upon the meticulous and in-depth implementation 
analysis allows us to make the case for (CIA-β
(*)
) even more compelling. 
As to the formal refusers, we know from careful interviews with clients and staff (cf. Section 
2.2) that, at the time of random assignment, New Deal entrants really had no clue of what ERA 
would entail, as the description of the program was purposefully left extremely vague in order to 
avoid disappointing control group members.
40
 Walker et al. (2006) conclude that “very few cus-
tomers could be described as understanding ERA, and all of them had already been assigned to the 
program group and therefore had been given further details about the services available” and “there 
was a consensus among the Technical Advisers who conducted both the observations and the inter-
views with customers […] that most customers truly did not have a good appreciation of ERA.” 
(p.43).
41
 Given thus that formal refusers had no substantive knowledge of what ERA was or would 
entail, they had no possibility to try ex ante to predict their idiosyncratic gain from it. 
As to the diverted customers, the qualitative evidence singles out the main source of diversion 
as being an incentive structure causing advisers to divert based on the very short-term non-ERA 
employment outcome (Y0) they predicted for the job-seeker. Specifically, all advisers were under 
pressure to meet job-entry targets within a ‘work-first’ office ethos, being rewarded personally (and 
at the office-level) based on how many customers they placed into a job – indeed, any job. Advisers 
thus had only one major factor driving their decisions as to whether to divert customers and/or steer 
refusal: a job-seeker’s likelihood to find any job as quickly as possible, i.e. non-ERA short-term 
employment probability. This diversion incentive applied to any adviser performing the intake, i.e. 
to ERA advisers as well. It has to be noted that while ERA had been designed as a primarily post-
employment support package, a view towards advancement would ideally begin ‘from day one’, 
with advisers ideally encouraging customers to wait for a better match for improved job retention 
and/or for a full-time job, rather than taking the first low-pay low-stay job that came their way. 
However, as mentioned, ERA advisers were subject to the same job-entry targets; the competing 
operational priorities facing ERA
42
 were so strong that six months into the program it was recog-
nised (Hall et al., 2005) that “the plan to begin advancement advice ‘from day one’ has not been 
realised” (p.23), “ERA advisers are finding it especially difficult to switch to a proactive way of 
working”, “over the next three years they will need to make the transition from ‘helping people get 
jobs’ to ‘making a sustained contribution to establishing their customers in decent well-paid job’”, 
                                                 
 
40
 The customer fact sheet given out at intake simply read: “Customers randomly selected to receive Employment Reten-
tion and Advancement Services will be working closely with an Advancement Support Adviser to find, retain and advance 
in work. Advancement Support Advisers will provide help for up to 33 months as part of a package of support”. 
41
 Indeed, the discussion within the Project Team arose about ‘informed consent’ (or ‘informed decline’), given that 
customers did not fully understand what they had consented to (or indeed, refused). 
42
 “ERA is seen as cutting across the grain of [the employment offices’] work-first ethos” (p.25). 
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and that “this transition is crucial and the evidence of this report is that it will need increased input 
and resources to be delivered at a strength that will make the difference intended” (p.26). 
Further support to the assumption that diversion was not driven by realised impacts is provided 
by the fact that ERA was a totally new program for advisers as well: never before had they been 
asked to help customers once in work. Indeed six months into the program the Project Team real-
ised that there was essentially no ERA treatment being delivered on the ground. The implementa-
tion study by Hall et al. (2005) noted that “there is at this stage little evidence that the content of 
pre-employment services differs much between program and control group members” and that “no 
district achieved any real focus on advancement during the early period of ERA” (p.23), concluding 
the final section on “The future of ERA” with: “There is evidence that raises real concerns about 
whether [the employment offices] can deliver ERA in the way the design requires”.
43
 
To summarise, violating the identifying (CIA-β
(*)
) assumption would require asking individuals 
to systematically predict, ex ante, the realised idiosyncratic impacts of a mystery program (New 
Deal entrants) or of a completely new program (advisers) – and to do so over and above any com-
pletely general heterogeneity in impacts based on the full set of rich observed characteristics (b(X) 
in models (4) and (4
*
)). The assumption of no refusal or diversion based on realised unobserved 
idiosyncratic ERA impacts would thus seem particularly defensible in the ERA case 
 
6. Empirical evidence on randomisation bias 
This section presents all our empirical results, first those relating to employment outcomes meas-
ured by administrative data (Section 6.1), then those relating to yearly earnings measured, for the 
most part, by survey information (Section 6.2).  
An overarching comment which applies to all the matching results is that our chosen estimator 
(kernel matching with an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.06 as in Heckman et al., 1997) 
has always performed extremely well in balancing the observables, both when estimating impacts 
(see Appendix Table A4) and when assessing the (CIA-0) condition. Also, while common support 
was always imposed, it never led to the loss of more than 1-2% of the group of interest. 
 
6.1 Employment  
6.1.1 ND25+ group 
The first column of Table 5 presents the experimental estimates of the average ERA impact for 
ND25+ participants (ATE1) in terms of time in employment and employment probability in the first 
follow-up year. The table displays both the raw experimental contrast and the regression-adjusted 
                                                 
 
43
 In response, the Project Team intervened with, among others, training events and advancement workshops for advis-
ers, so that over time the ERA treatment was effectively brought about. 
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estimate controlling for the observables in Table 2. Although randomisation has worked very well 
in the ERA experiment so that the program and control groups are well-balanced in terms of such 
characteristics, controlling for them can increase the precision of the experimental estimate by re-
ducing the residual outcome variance and also control for differences in observables that have oc-
curred by chance. Indeed for days in employment, the experimental impact becomes significant and 
the point estimates increase following the regression adjustment (see also Appendix Table A5.1). 
A small positive effect of ERA of an extra 4-5 days in employment and a 2.2pp higher em-
ployment probability at the end of the first year has been uncovered for the participants. 
But what effect would the full eligible group have experienced, on average?  
 
Table 5: Employment outcomes for ND25+: Experimental point estimates of the average impact for 
participants (ATE1) and residual bias in terms of non-ERA outcomes    
DAYS EMPLOYED EMPLOYED  AT MONTH 12 
ATE1 
(CIA-0) test 
  ATE1 
(CIA-0) test 
OLS Matching Probit Matching 
Raw 4.0 -9.4***      0.022**     -0.038*** 
Conditional on X 4.6* -7.9*** -9.7*** 0.022**  -0.029** -0.035***  
Notes: ‘Raw’ are outcome differences between non-participants and participants. ‘OLS’, marginal effect from ‘Probit’ 
and ‘Matching’ are adjusted differences, controlling i.a. for parsimonious histories (see Appendix Table A5 for results 
based on different ways of constructing labour market histories).  
 
Before turning to this question, we consider the results from testing the (CIA-0) condition that, 
controlling for our rich set of observables, participants and non-participants experience the same 
average non-ERA outcome. Table 5 reports the OLS/Probit and matching results from comparing 
the outcomes of the two groups conditional on observables. The overall conclusions are twofold. 
First, there remain large and statistically significant imbalances in employment outcomes, with non-
participants being on average 8-10 fewer days in employment and around 3pp less likely to be em-
ployed than observationally equivalent participants. Second, how past labour market history is 
measured makes no difference at all (see Appendix A5 for results based on different ways of sum-
marising labour market histories and for a more in-depth discussion). In contrast to Dolton and 
Smith (2011), but in line with Biewen et al. (forthcoming), more detailed, more sophisticated and 
flexible ways of capturing histories do not yield any gain in making non-participants and controls 
look similar in terms of their no-treatment outcome. Both of these conclusions apply for the NDLP 
group as well (see Appendix Table A5.1). For the subgroup of eligibles flowing in after April 2004 
(the subgroup for whom 2003/04 fiscal year earnings represent pure pre-treatment information), 
even the addition of pre-treatment earnings did not make any difference (Appendix Table A5.2). 
The claim often made in the literature (see e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, Heckman and Smith, 
1999, Heckman et al., 1998, Heckman et al., 1999, and Frölich, 2004, and to some extent Hotz et 
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al., 2005) that histories variables can capture labour-market relevant unobservables is thus not 
borne out in our data, at least for the no-treatment case, which is indeed the case of interest when 
using non-experimental comparison groups for estimating treatment effects.  
Having shown that the ERA study participants are different from the non-participants (in terms 
of observed as well as unobserved characteristics) is not enough to infer that randomisation bias is 
present; what is also needed is that such uncovered compositional differences effectively translate 
into an experimental impact which is different from the average effect that the full eligible popula-
tion would have experienced had ERA been implemented in routine mode. It is thus the comparison 
of the experimental estimates of the ATE1 to the estimates of the ATE which is informative of the 
presence and direction of randomisation bias.  
To this end, Table 6 presents the experimental impact estimate for the participants (ATE1) and 
two sets of non-experimental estimates for the non-participants (ATE0) and for all eligibles (ATE). 
The first set relies on the (CIA-1
(*)
) assumption and ignores the mismatch documented in Table 5 in 
the non-ERA outcomes of the non-participants and observationally similar participants. As seen in 
Section 5.2, these estimates are biased under our identifying assumption (CIA-β
(*)
). The second set 
of estimates has been adjusted to correct for such mismatch and corresponds to the estimates di-




Table 6: Employment outcomes for ND25+: Average ERA impacts for participants (ATE1), non-
participants (ATE0) and all eligibles (ATE) 
  ATE1   ATE0   ATE ATE1 ≠ ATE 
DAYS EMPLOYED Unadjusted  
4.6* 
10.1*** 5.9*** * 
 Adjusted 0.5 3.7 ** 
EMPLOYED  M=12 Unadjusted  
0.022** 
0.045*** 0.027*** * 
 Adjusted 0.014 0.020* ** 
Notes: Unadjusted estimates ignore failure of the (CIA-0
(*)
) test. Share of non-participants is 0.23. Kernel matching 
with Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth of 0.06); statistical significance based on bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence 
intervals (1000 replications); ATE1 ≠ ATE: bootstrap-based statistical significance of the difference; *** significant at 
1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
The difference between the ATE1 and the adjusted ATE is found to be statistically different 
from zero, with the experimental estimates having a tendency to overestimate the average effect that 
all eligibles would have enjoyed absent randomisation: participants experience an extra 4.6 days in 
employment thanks to ERA (significant at 10%), while no statistically significant impact could be 
detected for all eligibles; participants also enjoy a 2.2pp increase in employment probability (sig-
nificant at 5%), compared to a 2.0pp gain for all eligibles (significant at 10%). A certain extent of 
randomisation bias thus seems to affect the ND25+ experimental estimates in terms of employment 
outcomes. 
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Table 6 further shows that had we simply relied on the standard assumption for the ATNT, 
(CIA-1
(*)
), we would have reached quite a different conclusion. If we ignored that the (CIA-0
(*)
) test 
failed and only corrected for differences in observed characteristics between participants and non-
participants in estimating the effect of ERA on the full eligible population, we would conclude that 
the experimental estimate underestimates how much ERA would have improved the employment 
outcomes of all eligibles absent randomisation. Specifically, the employment gain for the non-
participants (10 days and 4.5pp) would appear to be more than double that of participants (4.6 days 
and 2.2pp), resulting in highly statistically significant overall ATE’s of 6 days and 2.7pp, which are 
statistically different from the ATE1’s. Relying on the estimate of the ATNT based on invoking the 
standard (CIA-1
(*)
) assumption and ignoring its rejection under (CIA-β
(*)
) would thus have led to an 
erroneous conclusion as to the direction of randomisation bias.  
 
6.1.2 NDLP group 
Table 7 shows that, in contrast to the case of ND25+, the ERA offer has left the duration and inci-
dence of employment of NDLP participants completely unaffected during the follow-up year.  
Before turning to our estimates for all eligibles, we again consider the results of the (CIA-0) 
test (Table 7; see also Appendix Table A5.1). Perhaps surprisingly, for both employment outcomes 
there are no statistically significant raw differences in the average no-treatment outcomes of non-
participants and participants. Large and statistically significant differences however emerge once 
controlling for observables, with non-participants being now 10-12 fewer days and 4pp less likely 
to be employed than observationally equivalent controls. We have however to control for relevant 
pre-treatment characteristics as there are sizeable imbalances in the raw groups, e.g. 21.7% of non-
participants are employed (and 13.1% are not on benefits) at inflow, compared to only 13.3% (and 
7%) of participants, and 47.8% of non-participants were never employed in the 3 pre-inflow years 
against 50.5% of participants (see also Appendix A1 for marginal effects). 
 
Table 7: Employment outcomes for NDLP: Experimental point estimates of the average impact for 
participants (ATE1) and residual bias in terms of non-ERA outcomes    
DAYS EMPLOYED EMPLOYED  AT MONTH 12 
ATE1 
(CIA-0) test 
  ATE1 
(CIA-0) test 
OLS Matching Probit Matching 
Raw -0.1 3.8      -0.007     -0.003 
Conditional on X -2.2 -10.4*** -11.2** -0.014 -0.040*** -0.039** 
Notes: ‘Raw’ are outcome differences between non-participants and participants. ‘OLS’, marginal effect from ‘Probit’ 
and ‘Matching’ are adjusted differences, controlling i.a. for parsimonious histories (see Appendix Table A5 for results 
based on different ways of constructing labour market histories).  
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Table 8 presents estimates of the three causal parameters of interest. For the ATE0 and ATE, 
both the unadjusted non-experimental estimates and the estimates corrected for the bias in terms of 
mean no-treatment outcomes are shown. 
If one were to ignore failure of the (CIA-0
(*)
) condition and hence, under CIA-β
(*)
), violation of 
the (CIA-1
(*)
) assumption, one would conclude that the experimental estimate of no ERA impact on 
employment outcomes is representative of the average effect that the eligibles would have experi-
enced absent randomisation. In particular, the employment effect in terms of either employment du-
ration or probability would have been the same – and statistically indistinguishable from zero – for 
the experimental group, the non-participants and all eligibles. 
This conclusion of an absence of randomisation bias is however again qualified under our pre-
ferred estimates which adjust for selection on non-ERA outcome-relevant unobserved characteris-
tics. Specifically, the adjusted estimates of the ATE are statistically different from – and smaller 
than – the corresponding experimental estimates. While for employment durations neither the ex-
perimental ATE1 nor the adjusted estimate for the ATE reach statistical significance, for employment 
probability the adjusted ATE of a 2.2pp fall is significant at the 10% level. Under our preferred 
specification we thus find some weak evidence of randomisation bias, whereby a zero impact for 
the study participants would not always be representative of the impact that the eligible group 
would have experienced in the absence of randomisation. 
 
Table 8: Employment outcomes for NDLP: Average ERA impacts for participants (ATE1), non-
participants (ATE0) and all eligibles (ATE) 
  ATE1    ATE0   ATE ATE1 ≠ ATE 
DAYS EMPLOYED Unadjusted 
-2.2 
-2.1 -2.2 no 
 Adjusted -13.4** -5.6 ** 
EMPLOYED  M=12 Unadjusted 
-0.014 
0.000 -0.010 no 
 Adjusted -0.039** -0.022* ** 
Notes: Unadjusted estimates ignore failure of the (CIA-0
(*)
) test. Share of non-participants is 0.304. Kernel matching 
with Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth of 0.06); statistical significance based on bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence 
intervals (1000 replications); ATE1 ≠ ATE: bootstrap-based statistical significance of the difference; *** significant at 
1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
 
6.2 Earnings  
For both intake groups, the experiment highlights a sizeable and statistically significant gain in av-
erage earnings in the first follow-up year: £445 for the ND25+ group and an even more substantial 
£788 for the NDLP group (see Table 9). These adjusted experimental contrasts are based on the 
survey sample with non-missing earnings information. Slightly less than half (49%) of the New 
Deal ERA study participants were randomly selected to take part in the first-year follow-up survey. 
Not all the selected individuals could however be located or accepted to take the survey. Response 
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rates remained high though: 87% among the NDLP and 75% among the ND25+ fielded samples. Of 
these respondents, 10% have however missing information on yearly earnings. Thus, for only one 
third of all ERA study participants do we observe earnings (31% in the ND25+ and 35% in the 
NDLP group). It thus follows that earnings information is available for one quarter of the ERA eli-
gibles (23.6% of the ND25+ and 24.1% of the NDLP eligibles).  
The survey sample was randomly chosen, and while there is good evidence (see Dorsett et al., 
2007, Appendix G) that the survey respondents did not differ dramatically from the non-
respondents – both in terms of baseline characteristics and administrative outcomes – no analysis 
has been performed on item non-response, i.e. on those 10% of survey sample members who did 
not respond to the earnings question. In our definition of non-respondents we have lumped survey 
and item non-respondents, since impact estimates on earnings can only be obtained for our narrower 
definition of respondents.  
 
Table 9: Survey earnings: Experimental contrast for respondents (∆S=1,X) and impact on all eligibles 
(ATE) 
  ND25+  NDLP 
∆S=1,X  445.4**  ∆S=1,X  ≠ ATE 788.1***   ∆S=1,X  ≠ ATE 
ATE 
Weighting 579.6**     not sig 762.1*** not sig 
Matching 551.2***     not sig 708.5*** not sig 
Notes: ∆S=1,X is the experimental contrast ignoring potential non-response bias, adjusted for X. 
Matching estimator: kernel matching with Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth of 0.06), estimates pertain to those non-
participants satisfying both support conditions. Statistical significance based on bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence 
intervals (1000 replications): *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
To derive estimates of the impact of ERA for all eligibles in terms of survey-based earnings, 
we thus apply the weighting and matching approaches accounting for non-response outlined in Sec-
tion 5.3. Table 9 compares the estimated impact for the eligible population to the regression-
adjusted experimental contrast calculated on the responding participants. 
Once non-response and non-participation are taken into account using either method, point es-
timates increase for the ND25+ group and remain largely stable for the NDLP group. The two non-
experimental methods produce point estimates quite close to each other, which are not statistically 
different from the adjusted experimental contrast on respondents. For either intake group, we thus 
find that the statistically significant and sizeable earnings impact uncovered for survey respondents 
extends to all eligibles.  
In the case of survey outcomes, in addition to the arguably weak assumption of no selection 
into the study based on the realised unobserved idiosyncratic gain (once allowing for arbitrarily het-
erogeneous impacts according to observed characteristics), we have to invoke additional assump-
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tions about the response process. We now turn to presenting the results from the sensitivity analyses 
we have suggested based on two special subgroups (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Sensitivity analyses for earnings outcomes 
(i)  ND25+ 
(CIA-0) test in terms of 2004/05 earnings (admin) 
 History Raw θ raw OLS Matching N 
Post-April group monthly employment -147 0.937 -240 -208 2,723 
March-May group summary+month. emp. -465* 0.776 -275 -109 1,935 
 
Full March-May group    
 p ATE1 ATE0 ATEadm ATE1 ≠ ATEadm 
   (a) 2004/05 earnings (admin) 0.248 183.9 531.7** 270.2 not sig 
 
(b) annual earnings (survey)  ∆S=1,X  ≠ ATEsurv ATEadm ≠ ATEsurv 
∆S=1,X  273.1    
ATEsurv 
Weighting 819.6    not sig not sig 
Matching 700.4** not sig not sig 
 
(ii)  NDLP 
(CIA-0) test in terms of 2004/05 earnings (admin) 
 History Raw θ raw OLS Matching N 
Post-April group summary  210 1.087 -82 -69 3,002 
March-May group summary  323 1.132 -10 52 1,845 
 
Full March-May group   
 p ATE1 ATE0 ATEadm ATE1 ≠ ATEadm 
   (a) 2004/05 earnings (admin) 0.320 375.9 621.8 454.7* not sig 
  
(b) annual earnings (survey)  ∆S=1,X  ≠ ATEsurv ATEadm ≠ ATEsurv 
∆S=1,X  736.1   
ATEsurv 
Weighting 759.9 not sig not sig 
Matching 566.0 not sig not sig 
Notes: ‘Raw’ are earnings differences between non-participants and participants. ‘OLS’ and ‘Matching’ are adjusted 
differences. Incidence of non-participation is p; ATE1 is the average impact for participants, ATE0 for non-participants 
and ATE (either in terms of administrative or survey earnings) for all eligibles. 
 
 
For both the Post-April and March-May inflow subgroups of the ND25+ and NDLP intake 
groups, the (CIA-0) test in terms of administrative earnings is passed, i.e. no statistically significant  
differences in non-ERA earnings remain between non-participants and matched participants.
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Table 10(a) shows that ERA has increased average earnings for participants, non-participants 
and all eligibles among the March-May group, though only the estimates for ND25+ non-
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 The way of summarising labour market histories for the Post-April group that produced the best balancing was then 
used to obtain the estimates in terms of survey earnings for the full sample in Table 10. 
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participants and for all NDLP eligibles manage to reach statistical significance. What is of interest, 
however, is that the impact for participants in terms of administrative earnings is representative of 
the impact for all eligibles. 
The March-May group lends itself to a more direct robustness check as this is the subgroup for 
whom fiscal year earnings in 2004/05 correspond to yearly earnings in the 1-year follow up period, 
the same horizon covered by survey earnings.
45
 Assumption (CIA-β) identifies the ATE for the 
March-May group in terms of administrative earnings (ATEadm). Under (CIA-β) and assuming that 
administrative and survey earnings covering the same horizon essentially measure the same impact 
(for which we found support as for the survey respondents among the March-May group the ex-
perimental contrast in terms of administrative earnings is not statistically different from the one in 
terms of survey earnings), we can assess how well the proposed matching and weighting estimators 
based on survey respondents deal with non-response by comparing their earnings estimate of the 
ATE for the March-May group (ATEsurv) to the ATE estimate for the March-May group in terms of 
administrative earnings (ATEadm). 
Table 10(b) reports the results of this analysis, which unfortunately are not particularly compel-
ling given that the small size of this subgroup (25% of the eligibles) coupled with the use of non-
parametric methods makes it difficult to reach statistical significance. The estimates for the March-
May group are positive but mostly statistically insignificant. As to our robustness checks, none of 
the non-experimental estimates based on survey earnings is statistically different from the ATE es-
timated from fiscal year administrative data, or indeed from the adjusted experimental contrast for 
survey respondents. The implementation of this sensitivity analysis clearly suffers from the small 
size of the group, which prevents one to discriminate with enough precision between estimates us-
ing different non-parametric methods. Limiting the sample of interest around the start of the fiscal 
year entails a heavy price in terms of precision. On the other hand, widening the temporal window 
that defines the group would reduce comparability of administrative and survey earnings outcomes. 
Even though we thus fail to get strong guidance from the March-May group, the picture that 
emerges is consistent with the experimental impact on survey respondents to be a reliable estimate 
of the effect that ERA would have had on the annual earnings of the full eligible group – one which 
in addition to the non-participants includes all the participants, i.e. the non-respondents among the 
participants as well. 
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 Both in the case of ND25+ and NDLP, the participants among the March-May group pass the following basic checks. 
Random assignment as expected keeps holding (at least in terms of balancing the observables) and none of the follow-
ing estimates is significantly different from one another in the sense that the confidence interval for the difference of the 
estimates includes zero already at the most conservative level: the experimental contrast in terms of administrative earn-
ings for the survey respondents among the March-May group, the experimental impact estimate in terms of administra-
tive earnings for the full March-May group and the experimental contrast in terms of survey earnings for the respon-
dents among the March-May group. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have set out a framework to think about randomisation bias, a form of bias which 
can potentially render the causal inference from randomised experiments irrelevant for policy pur-
poses. We have also provided what is to our knowledge the first empirical evidence on the presence 
and extent of randomisation bias in a social experiment, the ERA study.  
For both intake groups we have found evidence that non-participation in the ERA study has in-
troduced some randomisation bias in the experimental impact estimates in terms of employment 
measures, but not in terms of survey earnings. 
Provided individuals did not participate in the study based on residual unobserved idiosyncratic 
impact components, we have shown that we can draw on random assignment to assess the validity 
of estimates arising from non-experimental methods based on the standard CIA assumption. The 
power of this strategy was demonstrated for the case of ERA, where the additional information from 
the experiment consistently overturned the conclusions on employment impacts arising from stan-
dard non-experimental methods applied to the available data. Additional findings from the test ex-
ploiting the experimental set-up highlighted how the claim often made in the literature that histories 
variables modelled in a flexible way can capture no-treatment outcome-relevant unobservables is 
far from being of general validity. Care should thus be taken when considering impact estimates 
typically obtained using matching methods based on the statement that controlling for detailed his-
tories from administrative data adequately deals with selection. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that we were in a position to assess randomisation bias in the 
ERA experiment because the treatment was the bestowing of eligibility, and in the absence of ran-
domisation this new eligibility would have covered a well-defined and observed population. Future 
research efforts should be directed to consider the case of randomised trials of voluntary treatments, 
in which case both the group of treated under normal operation and the treatment effect for this 
group are unobserved. 
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Appendices 
A1. Marginal effects from probit models of being a non-participant versus a participant 
    ND25+    NDLP 
Scotland -0.163***    -0.253***  
NE England 0.104***     -0.001     
NW England -0.093***    -0.264***  
Wales -0.051***    -0.096***  
E Midlands 0.023       0.157***   
2nd month of RA -0.071***    -0.038     
3rd month of RA -0.056**     -0.040     
4th month of RA -0.075***    -0.053**   
5th month of RA -0.067***    -0.073***  
6th month of RA -0.084***    -0.054**   
7th month of RA -0.093***    -0.031     
8th month of RA -0.093***    -0.049*    
9th month of RA -0.087***    -0.090***  
10th month of RA -0.119***    -0.108***  
11th month of RA -0.086***    -0.086***  
12th month of RA -0.114***    -0.107***  
13th month of RA -0.134***               
Female -0.009       -0.008     
Age at inflow -0.019***    0.009     
Missing age -0.215***    0.265*     
Ethnic Minority 0.037**      -0.001     
Missing ethnicity 0.012       0.023     
Has disability/claims IB at inflow 0.007       -0.004     
Has partner, ND25+ -0.010            
2 children, NDLP  -0.007     
≥3 children, NDLP  -0.026     
Youngest child <1 at inflow, NDLP  -0.009     
Youngest child 1-5 at inflow, NDLP  0.021     
Not on benefits at inflow, NDLP  0.118***   
Early entrant, ND25+ -0.032            
Employed at inflow 0.042*       0.132***   
Show up same day -0.000 0.120     
Show up w/in 30 days -0.029**     -0.059***  
Past participation in basic skills 0.007       0.012     
Past participation in ND25+: once 0.001       0.082**    
Past participation in ND25+: twice 0.011       0.111**    
Past participation in ND25+: ≥3 0.044       0.059     
Past participation in voluntary programs -0.039***    0.022     
Spent <50% of past 3 yrs on active benefits -0.008 0.035        
Spent >50 & <100% of past 3 yrs on active benefits -0.006            
Spent 0% of past 3 yrs on inactive benefits -0.076 -0.053     
Spent >0 & <50% of past 3 yrs on inactive benefits -0.051 0.005     
Spent >50 & <100% of past 3 yrs on inactive benefits -0.084 -0.017     
Spent >0 & <25% of past 3 yrs in employment -0.015 0.011     
Spent ≥25% and <50% of past 3 yrs in employment -0.027*      -0.008     
Spent ≥50% of past 3 yrs in employment -0.075***    -0.048***  
Total New Deal caseload at office (100) -0.002*      -0.004***  
Share of lone parents in New Deal caseload at office 0.024       -0.048*    
Bottom quintile of local deprivation 0.046       -0.006     
2nd quintile of local deprivation 0.050**      0.051     
3rd quintile of local deprivation 0.031*       0.020     
4th quintile of local deprivation 0.028**      -0.020     
TTWA-level unemployment rate 0.681        -1.306     
Postcode missing or incorrect 0.417***     -0.061     
Observations      7794       7258 
Pseudo R squared 0.069 0.121 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; 
See Table 2 for list of regressors; parsimonious summary of labour market histories used in the above probits. 
 
A2: Parallels between the difference-in-differences method and the identification strategy invoking (CIA-β) to correct for a violation of (CIA-0) 
Note: For the DiD, the time-subscript for outcomes in the follow-up period is omitted. 
 Difference-in-Differences (CIA-β) to correct for a violation of (CIA-0) 
Parameter Missing counterfactual E(Y0 | Q=1) for the ATT  Missing counterfactual E(Y1 | Q=0) for the ATNT 
 DiD can deal with violations of (CIA-0) only for the ATT.
a
 This paper is ambitiously trying to perform a similar task but for the ATNT. 
Assumptions (1)  Unaffected Sampled Period (USP):  
no treatment effect in the pre-treatment period  
(1)  (Follow-up) potential outcomes are not affect by either  
- participation in the study (Y1Qi = Y1i and Y0Qi = Y0i for Q=0, 1) nor 
- randomisation per se (Yki(RCT=1) = Yki(RCT=0) = Yki for k=0,1 ) 
 (2)  Common Trends: the average change in no-treatment outcomes 
would have been the same for treated and non-treated with the same X: 
E(Y0 – Y0,pre | Q=1, X) = E(Y0 – Y0,pre | Q=0, X) 
Note this is the same as Bias Stability: the average bias from selection on 
unobserved characteristics affecting no-treatment outcomes (i.e. the 
violation of CIA-0) is the same in the pre- and post-treatment periods: 
Biaspre(X) ≡ E(Y0,pre | Q=0, X) – E(Y0,pre | Q=1, X)  
                = E(Y0 | Q=0, X) – E(Y0 | Q=1, X) ≡ Bias(X) 
(2)  (CIA-β): the average idiosyncratic impact would have been the same for 
treated and non-treated with the same X: 
E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=1, X) = E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=0, X) 
 
Identification  E(Y0  | Q=1, X) = E(Y0 |Q=0, X) + {E(Y0,pre |Q=0, X) – E(Y0,pre | Q=1, X)}  
            = E( Y| Q=0, X) + {E(Ypre |Q=0, X) – E(Ypre | Q=1, X)}  
       conditional matching     bias in terms of (CIA-0) in  
       estimate under (CIA-0)   the pre-treatment period 
E(Y1 | Q=0, X) = E(Y1 | Q=1, X) + {E(Y0 | Q=0, X) – E(Y0 | Q=1, X)}  
  = E(Y  | R=1, X)  + {E(Y | Q=0, X) – E(Y | R=0, X)}  
           conditional matching   bias in terms of (CIA-0) in the 
           estimate under (CIA-1)     same follow-up period 
Discussion  Under USP, any non-zero difference in average pre-treatment outcomes 
of the two groups is an estimate of the bias of the CIA-0 assumption in 
the pre-treatment period. Assuming that this bias is constant over time, it 
can be used to correct the estimate of the average no-treatment 
counterfactual estimated for the treated in the post-treatment period 
based on the average no-treatment outcome of the matched non-treated. 
 
Assuming that participation in the study and randomisation do not affect 
potential outcomes allows one to compare non-participants vs controls in the 
follow-up period (as USP allows DID to compare treated vs non-treated in the 
pre-treatment period). Assuming that both groups would have experienced the 
same average idiosyncratic impact, this difference can be used to correct the 
estimate of the average treatment counterfactual for the non-participants based 
on the average treatment outcome of the matched program group. 
Summary  Assumes that despite the (testable) presence of arbitrary selection into 
the treatment on levels: E(Y0,pre | Q=1, X) ≠ E(Y0,pre | Q=0, X),  
the trend would have been the same for both groups given X, on average:  
E(Y0 – Y0,pre | Q=1, X) = E(Y0t – Y0,pre | Q=0, X) 
i.e. allows (and tests) for selection on the level but rules out selection on 
the trend (or difference)  
Assumes that despite the (testable) presence of arbitrary selection into the 
treatment on levels: E(Y0 | Q=1, X) ≠ E(Y0 | Q=0, X),  
the idiosyncratic gain would have been the same for both groups on average: 
E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=1, X) = E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=0, X) 
i.e. allows (and tests) for selection on the level but rules out selection on gains 
(or difference)  
a
 For the ATNT, the DiD would need a group treated in period 0 for whom the treatment effect disappears in period 1, an implausible scenario (see Lechner, 2011). 
 
A3. Reweighting estimator 
As to the first term of expression (6), E[E(Y | R=1, S=1, X)]   
1
( )
( | 1, 1, ) ( | 1, 1) ( ( ) | 1, 1, ) ( | 1, 1)
( | 1, 1)
f x
E Y R S x f x R S dx E x Y R S x f x R S dx
f x R S
ω= = = = = = = = = =
= =
∫ ∫  
= E[E(ω1(x)Y | R=1, S=1, X) | R=1, S=1]  = E[ω1(x)·S·R·Y], with 
1
( ) ( 1, 1) ( 1) ( 1, 1 | 1)
( )
( | 1, 1) ( 1, 1 | ) ( 1 | ) ( 1, 1 | 1, )
f x P R S P Q P R S Q
x
f x R S P R S x P Q x P R S Q x
ω
= = = = = =
≡ = =
= = = = = = = =
 
where P(R=1,S=1|Q=1) is the probability among participants of being randomly assigned to the program 
group and of responding to the earnings question, and P(R=1,S=1|Q=1,x) is the corresponding conditional 
probability. 
E(Y1) can thus be estimated by reweighing by ω1(x) the outcomes of the program group members who 
responded to the earnings question and averaging them over this subgroup. 
Similarly, the second term of expression (3) can be rewritten as: 
E[E(Y | R=0, S=1, X)] = E[E(ω0(x)Y | R=0, S=1, X) | R=0, S=1] = E[ω 0(X)·S·(1–R)·Y], with 
0
( 1) ( 0, 1 | 1)
( )
( 1 | ) ( 0, 1 | 1, )
P Q P R S Q
x
P Q x P R S Q x
ω
= = = =
≡
= = = =
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A4. Matching estimator  
The matching estimator used for all the analyses in the paper is the kernel estimator introduced by Heckman 
et al. (1997), who similarly used an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.06. As seen in the table, this 
estimator could balance the observables extremely well (that was not the case for e.g. nearest neighbour or 
Mahalanobis-metric matching). While common support was imposed at the boundaries (i.e. discarding target 
individuals whose propensity score was larger than the largest propensity score in the group they were being 
compared to), it never led to the loss of more than 1-2% of the group of interest. Inference has always been 
based on bootstrapped, bias-corrected confidence intervals (based on 1,000 replications). 
Summary indicators of covariate balance before and after matching 
 Prob>chi Pseudo R2 Median bias 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Administrative outcomes       
ND25+ 0.000 1.000 0.069 0.001 4.2 0.6 
NDLP 0.000 1.000 0.121 0.001 3.8 0.8 
Survey outcomes       
Eligibles vs responding program group       
ND25+ 0.000 1.000 0.030 0.005 4.2 1.3 
NDLP 0.000 1.000 0.036 0.006 2.9 1.1 
Eligibles vs responding control group       
ND25+ 0.000 1.000 0.033 0.006 3.9 1.4 
NDLP 0.000 1.000 0.042 0.008 3.4 1.1 
Notes:  
Prob>chi: p-value of the likelihood-ratio test before (after) matching, testing the hypothesis that the regressors are 
jointly insignificant, i.e. well balanced in the two (matched) groups. 
Pseudo R
2
: from probit estimation of the conditional probability of being a non-participant (before and after matching), 
giving an indication of how well the observables explain non-participation. 
Median bias: median absolute standardised bias before and after matching, median taken over all the regressors. 
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), for a given covariate, the standardised difference before matching is the 
difference of the sample means in the non-participant and participant subsamples as a percentage of the square root 
of the average of the sample variances in the two groups. The standardised difference after matching is the 
difference of the sample means in the matched non-participants (i.e. falling within the common support) and 
matched participant subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the two 
original groups. 
A5. Testing the (CIA-0) condition: Supplementary material and discussion 
Table A5.1: Employment outcomes: Experimental point estimates of the average impact for partici-
pants (ATE1) and residual bias in terms of non-ERA outcomes for different ways of constructing la-
bour market histories   
DAYS EMPLOYED EMPLOYED  AT MONTH 12 
ATE1 
(CIA-0) test 
  ATE1 
(CIA-0) test 
OLS Matching Probit Matching 
ND25+     
Raw 4.0 -9.4***      0.022**     -0.038*** 
All other X’s plus       
  summary  4.6* -7.9*** -9.7*** 0.022**  -0.029** -0.035***  
  monthly employment  4.8** -7.6*** -9.4*** 0.023**  -0.028** -0.031**   
  ever employment 5.0** -7.6*** -9.4*** 0.022**  -0.028** -0.034***  
  sequence  4.8** -7.9*** -8.8*** 0.022**  -0.029** -0.033**   
  summary + monthly empl.  4.8** -7.7*** -9.2*** 0.023**  -0.028** -0.031**   
  summary + ever employed  5.0** -7.7*** -9.3*** 0.023**  -0.029** -0.034***  
  summary + sequence  4.8** -8.0*** -8.8*** 0.022**  -0.029** -0.033***  
NDLP   
Raw -0.1 3.8      -0.007     -0.003 
All other X’s plus       
  summary  -2.2 -10.4*** -11.2** -0.014 -0.040*** -0.039** 
  monthly employment  -2.4 -10.2*** -10.2** -0.016 -0.041*** -0.038** 
  ever employment -2.5 -11.0*** -12.1** -0.016 -0.042*** -0.043** 
  sequence  -2.4 -10.8*** -11.7** -0.016 -0.041*** -0.040** 
  summary + monthly empl.  -2.7 -10.6*** -11.1** -0.017 -0.042*** -0.039** 
  summary + ever employed  -2.2 -10.8*** -12.4** -0.015 -0.041*** -0.043** 
  summary + sequence  -2.1 -10.4*** -11.2** -0.015 -0.040*** -0.037** 
Notes: ‘Raw’ are outcome differences between non-participants and participants. ‘OLS’ (for days in employment), mar-
ginal effect from ‘Probit’ (for employed at month 12) and ‘Matching’ are adjusted differences. See Section 4.3 for the de-
scription of how labour market histories have been constructed. 
 
 
Table A5.2: Days in employment for the sample of inflow from April 2004: Experimental point esti-
mates of the average impact for participants (ATE1) and residual bias in terms of non-ERA outcomes 




  ATE1 
(CIA-0) test 
OLS Matching     OLS Matching 
Raw 6.6** -8.7***       3.2 
With pre-treatment earnings  8.0*** -5.4 -2.9 4.0 -15.0*** -13.6  
Without  8.0*** -5.4 -2.9 4.0 -15.0*** -13.6 
Notes: ‘Raw’ are outcome differences between non-participants and participants. ‘OLS’ and ‘Matching’ are adjusted dif-
ferences, controlling for all observables in Table 2, the parsimonious summary of labour market histories, and optionally 
for pre-treatment 2003/04 fiscal year earnings. 
 
 
A closer look at employment and benefit receipt status over time 
Figure A5.1 plots the non-ERA employment rate of participants and non-participants over time, from 
36 months before inflow into the ND25+/NDLP program to 12 months post inflow (where only the 
controls were used to calculate the post-inflow non-ERA outcomes for the participants).  
As to the ND25+ group, the first graph shows that the non-participants experience considerably lower 
employment rates both before and after inflow. (The sharp drop in employment probability at 18 months  
Figure A5.1: Non-ERA employment probability by ERA study participation status over time: Raw 
and adjusted for different ways of constructing labour market histories   
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Notes: Monthly from 36 months pre- to 12 months post inflow into the New Deal program. For pre-inflow periods, the full 
sample of participants was used, for post-inflow periods only the controls. All adjusted rates control for all the observables 
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Figure A5.2: Benefit receipt probability by ERA study participation status over time (36 months pre- 
to 12 months post-inflow): Raw and adjusted  


















Notes: Monthly from 36 months pre- to 12 months post inflow into the New Deal program. For pre-inflow periods, the full 
sample of participants was used, for post-inflow periods only the controls. Adjusted rates control for all observables in 
Table 2 and summary employment histories; results were indistinguishable in terms of how histories were constructed.  
 
before inflow is due to the fact that our sample started the ND25+ program, a program which becomes 
mandatory after 18 months on unemployment benefits). The raw differences in employment probabil-
ity in the pre-inflow period clearly highlight that sources of selection into the ERA study include em-
ployment-relevant characteristics. Three patterns emerge from the remaining graphs showing the ad-
justed differences. First, controlling for the available observables pretty much eliminates the observed 
pre-inflow compositional differences. Second, different ways of constructing labour market histories 
balance the two groups in the pre-inflow period to roughly the same extent; interestingly, monthly 
dummies are shown to be the best at balancing employment histories, while matching on sequences or 
on summary measures produces the same amount of (slightly inferior) balancing. Finally, and perhaps 
most strikingly, no matter how well the two groups have been realigned in terms of the pre-inflow 
employment rate history, the adjusted post-inflow employment rates remain the same, and indeed ex-
tremely similar to the unadjusted rates. In line with the results in Table A5.1, no matter how well bal-
anced the two samples are in terms of pre-inflow characteristics and histories, the raw outcome differ-
ences between non-participants and controls remain essentially unchanged after the adjustment. 
As to the NDLP group, raw pre-inflow raw differences between participants and non-participants be-
come notable shortly before inflow into NDLP, with non-participants experiencing higher employ-
ment rates than participants. Such differences are seen to persist for up to 9 months post inflow. 
Matching on observables and histories in the form of monthly employment dummies does an impres-
sive job in balancing pre-inflow employment rates; capturing histories using summary indicators per-
forms worse, and using detailed sequences the worst. However, as was the case for the ND25+ group, 
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their post-inflow non-ERA employment rates (indeed, non-participants are now found to perform 
worse than observationally equivalent controls). 
Figure A5.2 shows the same type of charts in terms of benefit dependency. (Time in employment and 
time on benefits are not mutually exclusive, as individuals can be employed at the same time as claim-
ing a benefit such as income support; this is particularly the case with the WPLS data, which contains 
no information on the amount of hours worked). For the ND25+ group, larger raw differences be-
tween participants and non-participants in the probability of being on benefits are present during the 
third year before inflow (with non-participants more likely to depend on benefits) and re-emerge after 
inflow (with non-participants less likely to depend on benefits). Adjusting the groups based on differ-
ent ways of creating histories balances the pre-inflow benefit incidence equally well, and indeed very 
well; however the post-inflow differences remain unchanged by the adjustment. In the case of the 
NDLP group, non-participants are less likely to be on benefits before starting the NDLP program and 
even more so after inflow. Again, the adjustment works well in balancing benefit receipt history but is 
found to only decrease post-inflow bias. 
 
 
Selection into the ERA study and how it is captured in the available data 
Summarising the discussion in Sections 2.2 and 5.4, there appeared to be two main sets of factors 
driving selection: 
1) predicted short-term non-ERA job entry probability, driving diversion incentives for caseworkers 
(either positively or negatively depending on whether they were New Deal or ERA advisers), as 
well as refusal decisions of individuals (who were more likely to refuse participation in the study 
if they had been unemployed for a long time and were thus finding it difficult to envisage what 
might happen after they obtained a job or else if they were feeling close to getting a job and did 
not want to stay in touch with the employment office); and  
2) specific traits and attitudes driving individuals’ refusal decisions such as a strong antipathy to gov-
ernment and feeling alienated from systems of support, being resistant to change or taking risks, 
enjoying being able to refuse to do something in the context of a mandatory program, possibly be-
ing engaged in benefit fraud. 
Our prior beliefs were that past labour market histories in terms of employment, benefit receipt and 
program participation over the previous three years would indeed capture both of these sets of selec-
tion drivers. First, (non-ERA) employment histories should closely reflect and hence capture short-
term (non-ERA) employment outcomes. Secondly, past histories are often convincingly viewed as 
encapsulating important traits of individuals such as tastes for leisure, discipline and work commit-
ment, accumulated experience, tenure and on-the-job training, family commitments, health status and 
reliance on government passive and active support. Indeed whether ND25+ entrants volunteered for 
the Gateway ahead of time as well as variables capturing the extent of past participation in voluntary 
employment programs should reflect an individual’s willingness to improve one’s circumstances and 
general attitudes to systems of labour market support.  
It was thus a great surprise that such an extensive set of variables aimed at capturing the underlying 
factors driving selection did such a poor job in addressing it. 
 
 
Comparison to Dolton and Smith (2011)  
While the non-experimental analysis of the NDLP program by Dolton and Smith (2011), DS in the 
following, is the closest and most comparable to the one in this paper, a few notable differences ought 
to be highlighted. 
First, the selection problem is different, both in terms of the treatment into which selection takes 
place, the population subject to selection and the selection decision unit. DS address self-selection into 
the voluntary NDLP program by eligible lone parents; here we address selection (mainly) by advisers 
into the ERA study among those lone parents who had already volunteered for the NDLP program. 
This paper thus considers selection into an additional treatment that was offered to the sample that had 
self-selected in the DS analysis (though DS analyze data from the very beginning of the NDLP im-
plementation in 2000-01; selection into that program may have been different at that point than it was 
in 2003-04 during ERA). As to the selection decision unit in this paper, most (87%) of the selection 
into ERA was driven by the advisers performing the intake, rather than the individual lone parents 
themselves (see Table 3). 
Second, the available conditioning variables are different, as DS did not have access to employment or 
earnings measures either from surveys or administrative data but did have access, for much of their 
sample, to survey measures of attitudes to work. The history variables constructed by DS have a finer 
temporal coarseness but only encompass history of benefit receipt over the previous 14 months, while 
the ones used in this paper consider time on benefits, time in employment and time spent neither in 
employment nor on benefits over the previous 36 months. 
Finally, it has to be stressed that DS do not claim to have removed all of the selection bias in their es-
timates, only to have moved them towards more plausible values compared to the official evaluation. 
They find that flexibly conditioning on histories rather on summary indicators is important in this re-
spect. By contrast, Table A5.1 clearly highlights how in our case the way histories are modelled does 
not make any difference whatsoever in decreasing selection bias (a bias which the availability of the 
experimental control group allows us to measure). 
 
 
